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Abstract 
The central purpose of this doctoral thesis has been to deepen our understanding 
of the nature of critical thinking by combining theoretical, empirical and 
methodological perspectives. The concept of critical thinking has a central role 
both in research on the philosophy of education and in empirical research on 
learning and teaching in higher education. Although it is true that the 
philosophical and empirical analyses of critical thinking and knowledge differ 
fundamentally, the present thesis argues that there are shared concerns between 
these two scholarly traditions. The thesis consists of four studies, each of which 
approached this aim from different viewpoints. The methods involved both a 
philosophical approach and an empirical multi-method approach. The dialogue 
between the empirical and theoretical analyses offers new insights into 
conceptualising critical thinking and its prerequisites and extends our 
understanding of variations in critical thinking.  
Based on the theoretical findings of these studies, I argue that normative 
elements (how things ought to be) and descriptive elements (how things are) are 
fundamentally intertwined in the educational research on critical thinking. 
Therefore, educational research on critical thinking requires both philosophical 
and empirical approaches and also dialogue between these two approaches. The 
theoretical part of the doctoral thesis further demonstrates how philosophical 
research can contribute to the normative elements of the prevailing empirically-
based theorisation of critical thinking, particularly by revealing some conceptual 
inconsistencies within this framework. The research further introduces the notion 
of fallibilism (human knowledge is uncertain) as a way out. Epistemological 
fallibilism fits the presumption of critical thinking better than relativism from the 
theoretical and pedagogical points of view. 
The empirical results revealed variation in (a) students’ skills and dispositions 
to think critically, (b) students’ ability to adapt their thinking and performance 
flexibility, (c) the nature of knowledge students consider to be relevant, (d) the 
knowledge that students use in problem-solving situations, as well as (e) the way 
 students process that knowledge. Based on these variations two profiles were 
identified: (1) superficial processing or (2) thorough processing. Superficial 
processing students reproduced information in the problem-solving situation. 
These students did not analyse, interpret, evaluate or synthesise knowledge, and 
their reasoning was very poor. They palmed off justification for knowing on 
authorities and others’ testimonies. In contrast to previous research, the results 
show that these students did not share the belief that knowledge is absolutely 
certain or unquestionable. Nor did these students share the view that beliefs 
accurately represent or correspond to reality. These students emphasised the 
uncertain nature of knowledge. The thorough processing students, by contrast, 
evaluated the quality of the information and considered its premises, as well as 
the implications of different conclusions. They weighed different options, 
analysed connections between claims, connected related ideas and gave mainly 
well-reasoned explanations and convincing arguments. The findings also show 
that the thorough processing students believed knowledge to be tentative and 
fallible. However, these students did not argue that all knowledge is constructed 
by human beings nor did they believe that all interpretations, theories and beliefs 
are equally right. They thus avoided slipping into relativism. The results revealed 
that both deeply superficial and thorough processing thinking entails problems if 
it is connected to an inability to adjust thinking or actions to the demands of the 
task. 
This thesis also identified several methodological challenges in assessing 
critical thinking. The results show that different performance-based critical 
thinking tests could give completely opposite pictures of a student’s abilities. The 
results further indicated that the group-level analyses could overrun the rich 
variations in test performance that occurred among individual students. 
Additionally, the thesis reminds us that the theoretical framework has a great 
influence on how data are analysed and interpreted. Finally, the thesis argues that 
one assessment or analysis method is not enough to evaluate the complex 
cognitive processes of critical thinking. Instead of a sole focus on empirical or 
theoretical elements, more communication between the theoretical, empirical and 
methodological perspectives is required to deepen the understanding of critical 
thinking among students of higher education.  
 
Keywords: critical thinking, performance assessment, epistemology, fallibilism, 
relativism 
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Tiivistelmä 
Tämä väitöskirjatutkimus tarkastelee korkeakouluopiskelijoiden kriittisen ajatte-
lun haasteita ja edellytyksiä, sekä kriittisen ajattelun ja tietokäsitysten välisiä yh-
teyksiä. Tutkimuksessani yhdistyy kasvatusfilosofinen ja kasvatuspsykologinen 
näkökulma. Tutkimukseni tavoitteena on selkiyttää korkeakoulututkimuksessa 
paljon hyödynnettyä teoreettista viitekehystä yksilöiden tiedosta ja tietämisen 
luonteesta. Aikaisemmissa, tähän viitekehykseen tukeutuvissa tutkimuksissa on 
todettu, että yksilöiden käsitys tiedosta ja tietämisestä on yhteydessä yksilön kriit-
tisen ajattelun taitoihin. Väitöstutkimukseni muodostuu neljästä osatutkimuk-
sesta, jotka tarkastelevat tutkimuksen tavoitteita eri näkökulmista.  
Filosofisen analyysin perusteella argumentoin, että kasvatuspsykologisessa 
kriittisen ajattelun tutkimuksessa normatiiviset (esim. mitkä arvot, päämäärät ja 
tavoitteet suuntaavat kriittisen ajattelun oppimista tai millainen kriittinen ajat-
telu on hyvää) ja deskriptiiviset (esim. miten opiskelijat analysoivat tietoa) tutki-
musintressit ovat kietoutuneet yhteen. Väitöskirjani osoittaa, että kriittisen ajat-
telun ja sen lähikäsitteiden kasvatuspsykologiset teoretisoinnit sisältävät selkeitä 
normatiivisia ulottuvuuksia. Tämän perusteella esitän, että kasvatuspsykologinen 
kriittisen ajattelun tutkimus tarvitsee sekä filosofista että empiiristä lähestymis-
tapaa ja ennen kaikkea näiden lähestymistapojen välistä yhteistyötä. Tutkimuk-
sessa kuvataan, miten filosofinen lähestymistapa voi edistää ja selkeyttää kasva-
tuspsykologisia kriittisen ajattelun teoretisointeja. Tutkimuksessa argumentoi-
daan lisäksi, että nykyisin vallalla olevat, lähinnä empiirisen tutkimuksen pohjalta 
rakennetut teoretisoinnit sisältävät useita käsitteellisiä jännitteitä, joiden yksi 
keskeinen syy on tietoteoreettisen fallibilismin puuttuminen. Fallibilismin mu-
kaan kaikki inhimillinen tieto on epävarmaa, mutta ihmisellä on mahdollisuus 
korjata ja kehittää näkemyksiään, käsityksiään ja teorioitaan. Väitöskirjani teo-
reettisessa osuudessa argumentoidaan, että fallibilistinen tietokäsitys soveltuu 
kriittisen ajattelun taustateoriaksi. 
 Väitöskirjani empiirisen osuuden mukaan opiskelijoiden kriittisen ajattelun 
taidoissa löytyi isoja eroja. Tutkimusaineistoista tunnistettiin kaksi kriittisen ajat-
telun profiilia: 1) pinnallisesti tietoa prosessoivat ja (2) syvällisesti tietoa proses-
soivat opiskelijat. Profiilit kuvaavat sitä, miten opiskelijat analysoivat, hankkivat, 
oikeuttivat ja käyttivät tietoa ongelmaratkaisutilanteessa. Pinnallisesti tietoa pro-
sessoivat opiskelijat luottivat auktoriteetteihin ja empiirisesti todistettuun tie-
toon. Nämä opiskelijat tukeutuivat ongelmanratkaisussa auktoriteettien antamiin 
valmiisiin vastauksiin ja toistivat tietoa sellaisenaan. He eivät myöskään esittä-
neet perusteluja johtopäätöksilleen. Lisäksi heidän argumentaationsa oli heikkoa. 
Syvällisesti tietoa prosessoivat opiskelijat sen sijaan korostivat omaa vastuutaan 
tiedon analysoinnissa. Nämä opiskelijat suhteuttivat, analysoivat ja vertailivat eri 
tietoja. Lisäksi opiskelijat pohtivat tiedon sovellettavuutta ja luotettavuutta, sekä 
esittivät selkeän ja perustellun ratkaisun ongelmatilanteeseen omaan analyysiinsa 
pohjautuen. Väitöskirjatutkimuksen tulokset osoittavat, että molempiin profiilei-
hin kuuluvat opiskelijat voivat kohdata ongelmaratkaisussa ylitsepääsemättömiä 
ongelmia, jos he eivät pysty joustavasti suuntaamaan omaa ajatteluaan ja toimin-
taansa ongelmatilanteen vaatimusten mukaisesti. 
Aikaisemmissa tutkimuksissa heikot kriittisen ajattelun taidot liitetään abso-
luuttiseen ja naiviin realistiseen käsitykseen tiedosta, kun taas hyvät kriittisen 
ajattelun taidot yhdistetään relativistiseen näkemykseen tiedosta. Tässä väitöstut-
kimuksessa opiskelijat, joilla oli ilmeisiä ongelmia tiedon analysoinnissa ja arvi-
oinnissa, ja sen seurauksena tukeutuivat auktoriteetteihin, eivät kuitenkaan olet-
taneet tiedon olevan erehtymätöntä ja lopullista. Nämä opiskelijat eivät myöskään 
kuvailleet, että yksilön käsitykset olisivat suoria kopioita todellisuudesta. Vastaa-
vasti opiskelijat, jotka itsenäisesti arvioivat ja prosessoivat tiedon alkuperää ja 
esittivät perusteltuja johtopäätöksiä, eivät olettaneet, että kaikki tieto olisi heidän 
omaa konstruktiotaan. Näiden opiskelijoiden mukaan tietoa voidaan arvioida, 
suhteuttaa ja vertailla. Tämä tarkoittaa, että näiden opiskelijoiden tietoteoreetti-
nen käsitys ei edusta relativismia. Molempien profiiliryhmien opiskelijat korosti-
vat tutkitun tiedon epävarmaa, fallibilistista luonnetta. 
Väitöstutkimuksen metodologisen osuuden tulokset osoittavat, että samoihin 
kriittisen ajattelun taitoihin keskittyvät testit voivat antaa hyvin poikkeavan ku-
van opiskelijoiden taidoista. Testeihin liittyvien erojen lisäksi on erittäin tärkeää 
kiinnittää huomiota käytettyyn analyysimenetelmään sekä teoreettiseen viiteke-
hykseen. Myös näillä on suuri merkitys siihen, millaisia näkökulmia ja tuloksia 
kriittisen ajattelun arvioinneissa esitetään tutkimustuloksina. Tutkijoiden on 
myös hyvä tiedostaa, että ryhmätason analyysit voivat peittää alleen yksilötasolla 
ilmenevän variaation opiskelijoiden kriittisessä ajattelussa. Myös käytetyllä teo-
riakehikolla on suuri vaikutus tutkijan tekemiin aineistotulkintoihin. Väitöstutki-
mukseni tulosten perusteella argumentoin, että yksittäinen analyysimenetelmä 
 tai testi ei ole sellaisenaan riittävä kuvaamaan kriittisen ajattelun kompleksi-
suutta. Tarvitaan enemmän vuoropuhelua teoreettisen, empiirisen ja metodolo-
gisten näkökulmien välillä.  
 
Asiasanat: kriittinen ajattelu, epistemologia, tietokäsitys, fallibilismi, relativismi, 
osaamisen arviointi 
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“The value of an education in a liberal arts college is not the learning of many 
facts, but the training of the mind to think something that cannot be learned 
from textbooks.” 
- Albert Einstein; quoted in Philipp Frank, Einstein: His Life and Times 
(1948, 185) 
Critical thinking has been promoted as an educational ideal for centuries. The 
concept has its roots as far back as the history of Western philosophy—since the 
time of Socrates. It has been associated with such values as freedom and autonomy 
(Holma, in press; Winch, 2006). Critical thinking and reasoning are also fostered 
as individual capacities, which are seen to be the foundations for democratic 
citizenship as well as economic productivity (Arum & Roksa, 2011a). Critical 
thinking has thus been singled out as one of the most important skills for citizens 
of the twenty-first century (Halpern, 2014). Therefore, it is not surprising that 
mastering critical thinking is a goal that can be found in almost every higher 
education curriculum today.  
Although critical thinking is considered a vital skill for learning and for coping 
with an uncertain future (Halpern, 2014), there is mounting evidence that all 
higher education students do not improve their critical thinking skills, including 
reasoning, argumentation and problem solving, during their higher education 
studies (e.g. Arum & Roksa, 2011a, 2011b; Bok, 2006; Pascarella, Blaich, Martin, 
& Hanson, 2011). As Arum and Roksa (2011a, 121) have argued based on their 
longitudinal studies, for many higher education students “the gains in critical 
thinking, complex reasoning and written communication are either exceedingly 
small or empirically nonexistent”. Nevertheless, higher education has been 
identified as a suitable context in which to facilitate the learning of these skills 
(Rapanta, Garcia-Mila, & Gilabert, 2013). Yet graduate students have reported 
that their critical thinking skills are inadequate for their future working 
environments (Tynjälä et al., 2007), and employers have expressed similar 
concerns regarding students’ preparedness for working life (Tynjälä, 2008). 
 
Research on critical thinking is being pursued by scholar in various fields using 
two very different approaches, namely theoretical and empirical approach. In the 
field of higher education, empirical research on critical thinking has focused on 
 the development of critical thinking skills (e.g. Arum & Roksa, 2011a; Heijltjes, 
van Gog, Leppink, & Paas, 2014; King & Kitchener, 2002, 2004; Kuhn, 1999, 
2005). Researchers have also highlighted the importance of understanding critical 
thinking as a social activity (e.g. Kuhn, 2005; Moore, 2004, 2013). Previous 
research on critical thinking has frequently applied quantitative multiple-choice 
tests, questionnaires (e.g. Australian Council of Education Research [henceforth 
ACER], 2001; Heijltjes et al., 2014; Phan, 2008; Tremblay, Lalancette, & 
Roseveare, 2012; Glaser, 1942) or qualitative interviews (e.g. King & Kitchener, 
1994; Kaddoura, 2010; Kember, 2001). However, recently, many researchers have 
begun to question the reliability and adequacy of self-report questionnaires (e.g. 
Greene & Yu, 2014; Elby & Hammer, 2001). As a result, researchers have stated 
that there is a need to assess student performance directly (e.g. Elby & Hammer, 
2001; Hofer, 2004; Stes, Min-Leliveld, Gijbels, & Van Petegem, 2010), for 
example, students’ ability to construct arguments for and against a position using 
relevant and reliable information. Therefore, the focus on empirical research on 
critical thinking has begun to move to authentic performance assessment (i.e. 
Andiliou & Murphy, 2014; Klein, Benjamin, Shavelson, & Bolus, 2007; Shavelson, 
2010). At the same time researchers have also assumed that one assessment 
method is not enough to evaluate complex cognitive processes such as reasoning 
(e.g. Baartman, Bastiaens, Kirschner, & Vleuten, 2007; Dierick & Dochy, 2001; 
Maclellan, 2004). This doctoral thesis addresses these concerns and responds to 
them by exploring students’ critical thinking process in a problem-solving 
situation in which a qualitative multi-method approach was applied. The thesis 
also explores whether or not the measures of two performance-based critical 
thinking tests are equivalent. A strong variance in the test results would have 
profound implications, as this would mean that the form of assessment 
substantially affects the findings in the students’ outcomes (Bowman, 2010).  
 
Critical thinking is “regarded as a fundamental aim, and overriding ideal, of 
education” (Bailin & Siegel, 2003, 188; cf. Dewey, 1910; Winch, 2006) and it has 
an essential role in scientific practices. Considering that critical thinking has also 
been one of the most popular concepts in higher education for the last century, it 
is rather surprising that theoretical analyses in the context of learning and 
teaching in higher education 1  have been scarce. Nevertheless, the theoretical 
backgrounds for the concept of critical thinking have been discussed by many 
                                                        
1 The research on learning and teaching in higher education is a multidisciplinary research 
field that primarily utilises psychological and educational knowledge, yet also integrates 
knowledge from other behavioural sciences as well as from the social sciences. 
 scholars in the philosophically-orientated literature over the decades (e.g. Dewey, 
1910; Holma, in press; Siegel, 1988; Winch, 2006). 
In the literature on educational psychology, students’ creative and critical 
thinking is connected with the development of epistemological understanding, 
namely personal epistemology (e.g. Hofer & Bendixen, 2012; King & Kitchener, 
2002, 2004; Kuhn, 2005; Nieminen, Lindblom-Ylänne, & Lonka, 2004). Many 
scholars of personal epistemology (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Southerland, Sinatra, 
& Matthews, 2001; Kitchener, 2011) have emphasised that their approach is based 
solely on empirical research. That is to say, their research focuses on empirical 
evidence, and thus has little if anything to do with philosophical analyses of 
knowledge. As Southerland et al. (2001, 333) explain: “[t]he key to understanding 
the psychological approach to the study of knowledge is that the scientists of 
human behaviour view knowledge and beliefs as psychological constructs (clearly 
within Popper’s (1972) second world)." And, as elsewhere (2001, 331) they 
describe their interpretation of “Popper’s second world”: "the second is the world 
of subjective, individual, mental operations (the life of the mind or private 
consciousness)". Kitchener (2011, 89) also makes a distinction between 
philosophical epistemology and personal epistemology (which he recently has 
called PE) when he states that philosophical “[e]pistemology is concerned with 
providing an account of the justification condition—of when a belief or action is 
justified (warranted, appropriate)—whereas PE is concerned with determining the 
actual beliefs held by subjects along (perhaps) with causal or genealogical 
conditions. Justification and related concepts are, at their core, normative 
concepts”. According to him (2011, 84), “[i]nsofar as PE research aims to be 
scientific—something most PE researchers would seem to want—it should be 
committed to the empirical testability of its claims. This motif of positivism (or 
better empiricism) is a legacy we should retain as an essential part of an adequate 
epistemology for PE research”. Kitchener (2011, 85) goes on to state that “it 
[philosophical epistemology] could construct a completely philosophical theory of 
knowledge with no (or little) dependence on any scientific fact. It would follow 
therefore that a study of PE and the correlative concept of a PE would be different 
from this philosophical epistemology”.  
This thesis argues that it is true that the philosophical and empirical analyses 
of knowledge and critical thinking fundamentally differ from each other. 
Expressly put, a philosophical analysis of knowledge focuses on the adequate 
definition and justification of knowledge as a theoretical concept, whereas an 
empirical analysis of knowledge is interested in how human beings actually 
understand the nature of knowledge and how humans constitute and acquire 
knowledge. However, the purpose of this thesis is to argue that there are also 
shared concerns between these two scholarly approaches. To be exact, the 
descriptive assumptions concerning students’ conceptions of knowledge or critical 
 thinking become normative by nature when these assumptions are regarded as a 
goal of higher education. This is not a problem as such; rather it is a necessary 
characteristic of a model or theory constructed in a research approach that strives 
both to obtain knowledge from students’ actual conceptions and to make 
pedagogical recommendations for developing these conceptions. Therefore, the 
theoretical model constructed within this kind of research requires understanding 
students’ actual conceptions as well as the normative standards of knowledge. In 
other words, both empirical and philosophical research must be consulted. 2 
Descriptive and normative elements cannot be adequately determined without co-
operation between the two types of research. Unfortunately, these two strong 
research approaches have remained relatively separate in today’s research on 
higher education. This thesis argues that instead of focusing solely on empirical 
or theoretical elements, more communication between the theoretical, empirical 
and methodological perspectives is required to deepen understanding of the 
complex phenomenon of critical thinking. The thesis provides a multidimensional 
framework for analysing critical thinking by combining theoretical aspects from 
philosophical, educational and psychological traditions. 
 
                                                        
2 This does not, of course, imply that either of these approaches can provide any certain or 
final answers, but simply points out that they are devoted to approaching these particular 
questions and are thus likely to have the best available answers to their core questions. 
  
 
The concept of critical thinking derives from philosophical discussion. The 
definition and content of this concept have been debated in different philosophical 
traditions in the west (Holma, in press). In the early twentieth century, the 
American philosopher and psychologist John Dewey (1910, 9), the father of the 
modern critical-thinking tradition, referred to critical-thinking skills as reflective 
thinking and defined them as follows: “[a]ctive, persistent, and careful 
consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the 
grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends”. A number 
of scholars have built on Dewey’s work (e.g. Ennis, 1991; Fisher & Scriven, 1997; 
Glaser, 1942; Paul, Elder, & Bartell, 1991; see also the American Philosophical 
Association, 1990). Nowadays, there are several definitions of critical thinking. 
One that is widely used comes from the philosopher Robert Ennis (1991, 6), who 
defines critical thinking as “reasonable, reflective thinking that is focused on 
deciding what to believe or do”. This definition emphasises reflection and 
reasonableness as well as decision-making about belief and action. Ennis (1991) 
has further emphasised that critical thinking is an essential part of the problem-
solving process. Many philosophical scholars have agreed that the concept of 
critical thinking is normative in nature (e.g. Bailin & Sigel, 2003; Ennis, 1991; 
Siegel & Biro, 1997). As such, critical thinking refers to the idea of reasonable and 
good thinking. 
Critical thinking is often seen as a skilful activity in which a person may be 
more or less proficient (Fisher, 2011; Scheffler, 1965). Various definitions of 
critical thinking typically include a list of the thinking skills that characterise an 
ideal critical thinker. For example, Fisher (2011) lists the following: the ability to 
identify the elements in a reasoned case, especially reasons and conclusions; the 
abilities to identify and evaluate assumptions; the abilities to clarify and interpret 
expressions and ideas; to be able to judge the acceptability, especially the 
credibility, of claims; to evaluate arguments, analyse, evaluate and produce 
explanations; to be able to analyse, evaluate and make decisions; to draw 
inferences and produce arguments (see also Halpern, 2014). In the current 
empirically-orientated research on critical thinking (e.g. ACER, 2001; Tremblay, 
Lalancette & Roseveare, 2012) the notion of critical thinking as a skill has been 
pervasive (see also Holma, in press; Nicholas & Labig, 2013; Papastephanou & 
Angeli, 2007). However, many philosophers have argued that critical thinking 
 cannot be conceptualised solely by referring to a prescribed set of skills (Bailin & 
Siegel, 2003; Holma, in press; Fisher, 2011; Siegel, 1988, Scheffler, 1965; see also 
Halpern, 2014). It may happen that a person acquires the skills, but does not use 
them (Fisher, 2011). Therefore, it is not enough for students to have critical 
thinking skills; they also need to use these skills effectively (Holma, in press). 
Critical thinking always involves both the essential skills or abilities and the 
disposition to use them (Bailin & Siegel, 2003; Siegel, 1988). Siegel (1988) uses 
the term critical spirit, which combines some of the key elements of critical 
thinking. As he (1988, 39) puts it, “the critical thinker must have certain attitudes, 
dispositions, habits of mind and character traits which together may be labelled 
the critical attitude or the critical spirit”. In the philosophical literature, the critical 
spirit is seen as an inseparable part of critical thinking (Holma, in press). 
According to Ritchhart (2002, 27) the main dispositions are open-minded, 
curious, metacognitive, seeking truth and understanding, strategic thinking and 
scepticism. He also defines motivation, awareness and inclination as intellectual 
dispositions (Ritchhart, 2002, 37). 
Critical thinking also demands a comprehensive use of different types of 
knowledge (Bok, 2006; Ennis, 1991). There is a reciprocal relationship among 
critical thinking, knowledge and knowing: on the one hand, students need 
knowledge about a phenomenon before they can think about it critically (Halpern, 
2014); on the other hand, students must have the necessary skills to evaluate that 
knowledge. The concepts of knowledge and knowing are thus substantial aspects 
of conceptualising critical thinking. There are several definitions and 
classifications of the concept of knowledge. For example, philosophical 
epistemologists usually differentiate among three types of knowledge: 
propositional knowledge, procedural knowledge and knowledge by acquaintance 
(Everitt & Fisher, 1995; Ichikawa & Steup, 2012), although there is no consensus 
on the interpretation of knowledge or on the number of types of knowledge 
(Fenstermacher, 1994). For purposes of this thesis, the distinction between 
propositional and procedural knowledge is theoretically important.  
Propositional knowledge is defined as knowing that such-and-such is the 
case. This is sometimes referred to as factual or declarative knowledge. 
Propositional knowledge (i.e. knowing that) is usually distinguished from 
procedural knowledge (i.e. knowing how) (Ryle, 1949). In philosophical 
discussions propositional knowledge is related to such epistemological concepts 
as truth, justification, reason and evidence (Ryle, 1949; Scheffler, 1965; 
Niiniluoto, 1999; Shope, 2004). Scheffler (1965) has argued that the knowing that 
attributes of a person may reveal his epistemological orientations, such as the 
criteria for justifying knowing.  
Procedural knowledge, meaning knowing how to do something (i.e. knowing 
how to analyse, knowing how to solve problems; see Everitt & Fisher, 1995; Shope, 
 2004), is related to possessing a skill (Scheffler, 1965). In this sense critical 
thinking represents procedural knowledge. However, several researchers have 
assumed that procedural knowledge always involves some propositional 
knowledge as well (Everitt & Fisher, 1995; Smith, 2002; Markowitsch & Messerer, 
2007). For example, if a person knows how to play chess, he will probably know 
certain facts (e.g. rules) about playing chess. Smith (2002) has emphasised that 
an individual has a certain skill only when his performance reflects both 
procedural and propositional knowledge. It follows that critical thinking entails 
both procedural and propositional knowledge. A lack of propositional or 
procedural knowledge limits the possibility of critical thinking (Winch, 2006). 
In sum, an ideal critical thinker knows how to assess the strength of the 
evidence and the reasons that are relevant to the particular context or type of task. 
He or she also shows the disposition to draw on these skills (Bailin & Siegel, 2003; 
Halpern, 2014; Holma, in press; Scheffler, 1965). As Figure 1 illustrates, a critical 
thinker needs to have the propositional knowledge of what is reasonable, the 
procedural knowledge to evaluate and utilise that knowledge, as well as the 
disposition to do so. From this it follows that a critical thinker also needs to be 
autonomous: “free to act and judge independently of external constraint, on the 
basis of her own reasoned appraisal of the matter at hand” (Siegel, 1988, 89; see 
also Winch, 2002, 2006). These three elements are inseparable in the research 
and practice of critical thinking. However, it is important to notice that they are 
not necessary evenly distributed. It is thus possible, for instance, that a person has 
knowledge of what is reasonable and shows the disposition to use and assess that 
knowledge, but struggles with analysing and interpreting the knowledge. 
 
 
 
  
 In the philosophical and educational literature (e.g. Nicholas & Labig, 2013; Bailin 
& Siegel, 2003), there has been a great deal of discussion about whether critical 
thinking is general or discipline-specific in nature. As a background assumption, 
I assume that there are both general and domain-specific elements in critical 
thinking; either alone can capture this complex phenomenon. Although the 
conventions of critical thinking are commonly embodied in social practices (e.g. 
Arum & Roksa, 2011a; Elby & Hammer, 2001; Kuhn, 2005), there are myriad 
subjective elements (such as students’ prior knowledge, expectations, 
dispositions) related to and influencing critical thinking. Moreover, many 
dimensions of critical thinking (i.e. evaluating the reliability and relevance of 
evidence, identifying arguments, analysing information, addressing opposing 
viewpoints, reasoning) are relevant in each discipline. Moreover, it is possible that 
students’ reasoning and critical thinking may vary within a discipline. Concerning 
this issue, Bailin and Siegel (2003, 184) have asserted that, although critical 
thinking is always bound to a particular context and often involves subject-specific 
knowledge, “it simply does not follow that nothing general can be said about the 
activity of thinking”. Furthermore, they argue that the criteria of acceptability are 
not domain-specific. As far as I can see, the content-specific elements of critical 
thinking do not imply that critical thinking (such as reasoning or argumentation) 
can be evaluated only in relation to specific context, while outside this context 
nothing can be said of the credibility and justifiability of that. We can—and we 
need to—establish necessary assessment criteria in order to determine what kind 
of thinking represents valid or fallacious forms of reasoning. In this thesis, I 
mainly focus on general aspects of critical thinking. 
 
Research on personal epistemology today is one significant area in the 
investigation of learning and teaching in higher education. The research on 
personal epistemology explores individuals’ conceptions of knowledge from the 
perspectives of educational and developmental psychology (Hofer & Pintrich, 
1997, 2002). The literature on personal epistemology assumes that the 
development of creative and critical thinking is fundamentally linked with 
students’ conceptions of knowledge (Hofer, 2001, 2005; Kember, 2001; King & 
Kitchener, 1994, 2002, 2004; Lucas & Tan, 2013; Phan, 2008). Previous studies 
on personal epistemology have concentrated especially on: (a) developing the 
conceptions and dimensions of epistemological beliefs (i.e. King & Kitchener, 
1994, 2004; Kuhn, 1999; Perry, 1970; Schommer, 1990), (b) exploring how 
epistemological awareness is part of the thinking process (i.e. King & Kitchener, 
1994, 2004; Kuhn 2005), (c) assessing domain-specific aspects of personal 
 epistemology (i.e. Hofer 2000; Hammer & Elby, 2003; Kaartinen & Lindblom-
Ylänne, 2008; Muis, Bendixen, & Haerle, 2006) and (d) how personal 
epistemology is related to learning and student achievement (i.e. Hofer, 2001; 
2004a, 2004b; Barzilai & Zohar, 2012). 
According to Pintrich’s widely used definition, the term personal 
epistemology3 refers to “an individual’s cognitions about the nature of knowledge 
and the nature of knowing” (Pintrich, 2002, 390). The term also includes a view 
of one’s personal beliefs as a knower (Pintrich, 2002; Hofer, 2004). The term 
“personal epistemology can be described along a continuum from less 
sophisticated to more sophisticated ways of knowing” (Kaartinen-Koutaniemi & 
Lindblom-Ylänne, 2012, 2) or a progress “from a state of simple, absolute certainty 
into a multifaceted, evaluative system” (West, 2004, 61). This tradition has drawn 
heavily on William Perry’s pioneering work of the late 1950s, when Perry began to 
explore Harvard freshmen’s intellectual and ethical development during their 
college years (see Perry, 1970; Moore, 2002). On the basis of his research, Perry 
constructed a model demonstrating the variety and progression of students’ 
epistemological and ethical thinking in which students’ views of knowledge evolve 
from naive egocentrism, absolutism and dualism towards a relativist view. 
According to Perry (1970), the development from one position to a higher position 
does not follow a linear progression. Rather the progression is more likely to be 
wavelike and occur in surges. Perry (1970) also noted that there might be pauses 
between these surges, nor do all students reach the highest position on the model. 
Today in the research on personal epistemology, there are several variants on 
its hierarchical models (e.g. Baxter Magolda, 1992; King & Kitchener, 1994, 2002, 
2004; Kaartinen-Koutaniemi & Lindblom-ylänne, 2012; Kuhn, 1999, 2005; Perry, 
1970; West, 2004). All these models entail claims of superiority of some 
conceptions of knowledge as compared with others (Hofer, 2002; Pintrich, 2002). 
In other words, the literature of personal epistemology makes a distinction 
between a lower level of epistemological beliefs (i.e. in which knowledge is 
perceived as consisting of unchanging facts and is acquired directly from external 
authorities) and a higher level of epistemological beliefs (i.e. in which knowledge 
is seen as uncertain and constructed by the individual) (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997, 
2002; Hofer, 2005; King & Kitchener, 2002, 2004; Kuhn 2005; Kuhn & 
                                                        
3 In the literature there are numerous synonyms for the term of personal epistemology, 
such as epistemological beliefs, epistemological assumptions, epistemic thinking, 
epistemic cognition, epistemological understanding and reflective judgement. According to 
Barbara Hofer (2005, 95), “[p]ersonal epistemology, an umbrella term that encompasses 
research referred to under a variety of names such as epistemological or epistemic beliefs”. 
She further says that all “these terms have their foundation in the pioneering work of Perry 
(1970)”. Recently, Barzilai and Zohar (2012, 41) have explained the use of the term personal 
epistemology in the following way: “To refer to the field as a whole, we use the term 
personal epistemology, the term most often used in the literature”.  
 Weinstock, 2002; Valanides & Angeli, 2005). As Hofer (2002, 7) puts it: 
“[r]egardless of the number of stages, positions, or perspectives, the sequence 
invariable suggests movement from a dualistic, objectivist view of knowledge to a 
more subjective, relativistic stance and ultimately to a contextual constructivist 
perspective of knowing”. 
The idea of relativism as a sophisticated epistemological view is shared among 
different theoretical variants of personal epistemology (Briell, Elen & Clarebout, 
2013; Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Hofer, 2000, 2002, 2005, 2006b; Kember, 2001; 
Perry, 1970). The pioneering theory endorsing relativism is from Perry (1970, 
109–111), who describes a revolutionary step in students’ thinking in which their 
worldview becomes entirely relativistic. Perry (1970, 111) describes this level of 
personal epistemology as follows:  
Relativism is perceived as the common characteristic of all thought, all 
knowing, all of man’s relation to his world. Against this ground, dualistic right-
or-wrong thinking, and even “ideas of absolutes” becomes special cases in the 
new relativistically structured context. 
Recently, some scholars have denied that relativism is the most sophisticated 
conception of knowledge (e.g. Elby & Hammer, 2001; Kuhn, 2005; King & 
Kitchener, 2004; Kitchener, 2011; Muis et al., 2006; Schommer-Aikins, 2002). It 
has also been argued that Perry’s relativism has been misinterpreted as an 
ultimate form of relativism (Moore, 2002). However, it seems that today’s 
literature on personal epistemology still endorses relativism, for example, in many 
of its pedagogical recommendations (see Brownlee, 2004; Kember, 2001; 
Lahtinen & Pehkonen, 2013). In Hofer’s words (2006b, 74; see also 2001), “based 
on Perry’s developmental scheme, faculty members have been advised for several 
decades to help students move from their black-and-white thinking toward a more 
relativist stance”. In addition, the variants of personal epistemology, which have 
questioned the very idea of relativism as the highest level of knowing, assume that 
relativism is the necessary level through which one can develop towards the most 
sophisticated view of knowledge (Kuhn, 2005; King & Kitchener, 2004; see Table 
1). According to Kuhn, Cheney and Weinstock (2000, 310):  
In what we take to be a key event in the development of epistemological 
thought, the multiplist [the relativist] relocates the source of knowledge from 
the known object to the knowing subject, hence becoming aware of the 
uncertain, subjective nature of knowing. This awareness comes to assume such 
proportions, however, that it overpowers and obliterates any objective 
standard that could serve as a basis for comparison or evaluation of conflicting 
claims. Because claims are subjective opinions freely chosen by their holders 
and everyone has a right to their opinion, all opinions are equally right.4 
                                                        
4 Emphasis added. 
  
 
 
In recent years, research on personal epistemology has shown that the ability to 
think critically is embedded in a progression of epistemological understandings 
(i.e. King & Kitchener, 2002, 2004; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002; Kuhn, 1999, 2005; 
see also Table 1). It has also been demonstrated that students’ epistemological 
beliefs play an important role in their ability to evaluate the credibility of 
competing claims (Barzilai & Zohar, 2012). Several researchers have stated that 
students with higher-level epistemological beliefs have more sophisticated critical 
thinking skills than students with lower-level epistemological beliefs (King & 
Kitchener, 2002, 2004; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002; Kuhn, 1999, 2005). When 
students move on to the most developed epistemological level, their critical 
thinking tends to improve as well (Bok, 2006; Kuhn, 1999; Kuhn & Weinstock, 
2002). Many scholars within the tradition have also emphasised that students 
with higher-level epistemological beliefs have the ability to make context-specific 
judgements (e.g. Barzilai & Zohar, 2012; Kuhn, 2005; King & Kitchener, 2004). 
 In the context of personal epistemology, there are contradictory assumptions 
among scholars related to the theoretical groundings of the concept of critical 
thinking. Some hold that “critical and creative thinking is only possible if 
relativism is recognised” (Kember, 2001, 217), whereas others see critical thinking 
as being irrelevant within a relativist framework (e.g. Kuhn, 2005). In a similar 
vein, philosophical literature holds that the idea that critical thinking presupposes 
the relativist view of knowledge is untenable (e.g. Bleazby, 2011; Holma & 
Hyytinen, in press-a, in press-b).  
 
Relativism has been criticised as an extremely problematic epistemological 
position within philosophical epistemology (e.g. Boghossian, 2006; Niiniluoto, 
1999; Siegel, 1987). According to philosophical tradition, the relativist position 
implies that all knowledge is relative to the person who believes or that all 
interpretations, theories and beliefs are equally right. To put it simply, if all beliefs 
are equally right or relative to the person, then there is no reason to compare and 
evaluate different beliefs; all are equally justified (Holma, 2012). Hence, a crucial 
philosophical question that relativists have difficulty in answering is the problem 
of disagreement, given that, within the relativist framework, no belief can be seen 
as incorrect. In Boghossian’s words (2006, 39):  
If a given fact really does owe its existence to our intentional activities, it is 
hard to see how there could fail to be possible circumstances in which we might 
have chosen to construct a different fact incompatible with it.  
However, the most fundamental problem of relativism is that it is a self-refuting 
position. According to Harvey Siegel (1987, 8–9): 
the relativist must appeal to non-relativist criteria, and assert relativism non-
relativistically, in order to make the case for relativism. This is self-defeating 
for the relativist. But to fail to assert and defend relativism in this (non-
relativistic) way is to fail to join the issue with the non-relativist who asserts 
that relativism is false (or incoherent). So the relativist can defend relativism 
only by rendering it incoherent. Conversely, to defend relativism relativistically 
is to fail to defend it at all. For if relativism is right, the very notion of rightness, 
and indeed that of rational defense, is given up, and so it cannot coherently be 
claimed that relativism is right or rationally defensible. In short: to defend 
relativism is to defend it non-relativistically, which is to give it up; to ‘defend’ 
it relativistically is not to defend it at all.  
Boghossian (2006, 56) has argued that “either the formulation [the relativist] 
offers us does not succeed in expressing the view that there are only relative facts; 
or it consists in the claim that we should so reinterpret our utterances that they 
 express infinitary propositions that we can neither express nor understand”. The 
problem of relativism becomes evident when it is related to the concept of critical 
thinking: there is no need to evaluate ideas or search for alternatives because all 
ideas are equally trustworthy and justifiable (Bleazby, 2011; Holma & Hyytinen, 
in press-a, in press-b; see also Kuhn, 2005). Therefore, the idea that critical 
thinking presupposes the relativist view of knowledge is untenable.  
From the relativist point of view, the idea that all knowledge is generated by 
human minds is also considered as highly problematic (Boghossian 2006; 
Scheffler, 2000, 2001). It follows that knowledge can exist only if there are human 
beings who make and conceptualise it. For example, the world as constituted by 
the natural sciences can exist only when there are humans who perceive and 
conceptualise it. Israel Scheffler (1997, 199–200) has explained this problem in 
the following way:  
 Now, whether a world answers to a version of our making is, in general, not 
up to us. Thus, if an “actual world” answers to a version of our making, we can 
hardly be supposed to have made it do so. Moreover, if a version of our making 
turns out to be true, it hardly follows that we have made its objects. Neither 
Pasteur nor his version of the germ theory made the bacteria he postulated, 
nor was Neptune created by Adams and Leverrier or by their prescient 
computations. 
 
In examining the critical thinking of higher education students, researchers have 
used a variety of tests and assessment protocols. The assessments can be roughly 
divided into two main measurement protocols: self-reports and performance-
based assessments. In the area of critical thinking, previous studies have 
compared the results of self-reports with performance-based assessments (e.g. 
Bowman, 2010; Bowman & Seifert, 2011). These studies have shown that self-
reports and performance assessments measure different aspects of students’ 
abilities and therefore yield different pictures of those abilities. In the present 
study, both of these methods are used to explore students’ critical thinking. 
Self-reports, such as surveys, questionnaires and qualitative interviews, focus 
on students’ perceptions of their current attributes or how these attributes have 
developed over time (Bowman, 2010). The validity of self-report assessment has 
been discussed extensively (e.g. Bowman, 2010; Bowman & Seifert, 2011; 
Halpern, 1993; Pike, 1995, 1996, 1999). Halpern (1993, 279) summarises the 
problems of self-report instruments in the following way: “students may report 
that they have learned to think better when, in fact, they have not or, conversely, 
that they have not improved when they really have”. Self-report assessments can 
be described as indirect measures, because they do not directly measure students’ 
 performance or actual changes in their learning. Although such measures do not 
capture concrete evidence of changes in learning, they may be important 
indicators for improving educational processes (Shavelson, 2010).  
Performance assessment is sometimes presented as a new assessment 
approach (Andrews & Wulfeck, 2014; Dierick & Dochy, 2001). However, there is 
a long history of using performance-based assessment as an indicator of students’ 
learning and development in higher education in order to make educational 
decisions (see Douglass, Thomson, & Zhao, 2012; Ennis, 1991). The roots of 
today’s performance-based assessment can be traced to the first third of the 
twentieth century with the beginning of standardised testing (Shavelson, 2010). 
What the various performance assessments have in common is the goal of eliciting 
what students know and can do (Andrews & Wulfeck, 2014). Performance-based 
assessments can be further grouped into two approaches, namely (1) multiple-
choice tests or questionnaires and (2) constructed-response tasks. Below I 
differentiate between these two main forms of performance-based assessments. 
Multiple-choice tests have been the dominant testing regime in the field of 
research on critical thinking (cf. Ennis, 1991; Shavelson, 2010). In the test 
situation the student must analyse a question and then identify and select the 
correct answers from a list of given options. In contrast to the constructed-
response task, multiple-choice tests are often promoted as cost effective and 
objective (Brown, 2001), as there is no need for human evaluation in scoring them. 
The cognitive demands of multiple-choice tests have been debated for several 
decades (e.g. Bennet & Ward, 1993; Jensen, McDaniel, & Woodard, 2014; 
Lindblom-Ylänne, Lonka, & Leskinen, 1996; Nicol, 2007; Popham, 2003). Many 
researchers have argued that a multiple-choice test does not encourage students 
to use higher-order thinking processes (Nicol, 2007; Scouller, 1998). The 
reasoning behind that claim is that multiple-choice tests may be answered merely 
by low-level processing, such as factual recognition and selection (Lindblom-
Ylänne et al., 1996; Nicol, 2007). The general view also suggests that it is more 
difficult to construct an answer than to recognise it. It is also possible to obtain a 
correct multiple-choice answer without really understanding a problem or 
knowing the various aspects related to it. For example, students can choose one 
item among the possible choices that best suits the question asked, and, of course, 
it is possible to guess the right answer from the alternatives given. Examinees can 
be assured that the correct answer is among the response options. Another 
weakness is that students “may be able to recognize a correct answer that they 
would never have been able to generate on their own. In that sense, multiple-
choice items can present an exaggerated picture of a students’ understanding or 
competence, which might lead teachers to invalid inferences” (Popham, 2003, 81–
82). Although there is evidence that by applying a well-designed multiple-choice 
questionnaire it is possible to measure higher-order thinking (Jensen et al., 2014), 
 on the basis of a student’s answer it is not possible to determine how the student 
processed the test questions (Lindblom-Ylänne et al., 1996). Nor can multiple-
choice tests ever assess a student’s skill in synthesising or generating an answer 
(Popham, 2003). 
To address the limitation of multiple-choice tests, researchers have developed 
alternative assessment methods, specifically the constructed-response tasks 
(Bennet & Ward, 1993). There are several advantages to assessing students’ 
critical thinking by applying constructed-response tasks. As Coates and 
Richardson (2011, 63) put it: 
while well-designed multiple choice questions can measure complex real-
world thinking, many advanced forms of reasoning are best measured using 
tasks that require students to construct their response in the form of writing or 
drawing rather than selecting from a set of pre-defined alternatives.  
In the constructed-response tasks examinees create their own answers to the 
questions (Coates & Richardson, 2011; Shavelson, 2010; Rodriguez, 2003). These 
types of measures are often open-ended tasks in which students need to analyse, 
evaluate and synthesise complex information, as well as provide reasoned 
explanation (cf. Popham, 2003; Shavelson, 2010). Therefore, the constructed-
response tasks are said to promote higher-order thinking and encourage extended 
problem solving more than the multiple-choice tasks. Another advantage is that 
the constructed-response tasks can reveal the level of understanding (Popham, 
2003). They also allow students to demonstrate their writing skills (VanTassel-
Baska, 2014). The constructed-response task is sometimes referred to as authentic 
assessment because these tasks demonstrate the same thinking processes that 
individuals use when they solve complex problems in their daily lives (Andrew & 
Wulfeck, 2014; Baartman et al., 2006). In addition, Andiliou and Murphy (2014) 
have recently found that the constructed-response tasks support students’ self-
evaluation skills.  
However, several disadvantages of the constructed-response task have been 
reported. The most important is the difficulty of scoring (Attali, 2014). The 
constructed-response assessment is characterised as subjective and open to 
scoring bias, because examinees’ responses are traditionally scored using human 
evaluation. The scoring of constructed-response tasks is also considered time 
consuming and expensive; a large amount of time and effort is needed to train 
scorers and to score the responses (Attali, 2014). Recently, automated scoring of 
tasks has been developed (Almond, 2014). Popham (2003, 87) has also argued 
that constructed-response tasks “are tougher for test-takers”, because “a student 
really needs to understand something in order to construct a response on  
that understanding”. An example of a constructed response task is illustrated in 
Figure 2.  
  
 
 
Whether the multiple-choice test and the constructed-response task with the same 
content measure precisely the same characteristics has been debated for over 20 
years (e.g. Bennet & Ward, 1993; Fellenz, 2004; Rodriguez, 2003). According to 
Rodriguez (2003, 180), there is evidence that “the more carefully items are 
designed to measure the same aspect, the more appropriate it is to combine the 
 scores from each format without concern”. Recent research has shown that there 
are several aspects related to and influencing students’ test performance, such as 
dispositions (including motivation, open-mindedness, curiosity, metacognition), 
skills, test anxiety, cognitive processing during the test, the knowledge structure 
assessed, institutional or cultural barriers and adequacy of the tests (e.g. Arum & 
Roksa, 2011a; Fellenz, 2004). It is worth mentioning that these differences are 
found not only between the multiple-choice and constructed-response formats, 
but also within each test format. 
 
The above perspectives concerning the theory and practice of critical thinking 
offer a starting point for this doctoral thesis, which aims to deepen understanding 
of the emphases and gaps in prevailing research on critical thinking within the 
field of higher education. Table 2 provides a summary of the definitions of the key 
concepts in this study. Given this broader framework, it is possible to pin down 
different areas in critical thinking. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between 
the key concepts of the present thesis, which is based on the view that the adequate 
conceptualising of critical thinking involves knowledge, skills and dispositions. 
The empirical part of the thesis concentrates on students’ actions as well as on 
their thinking and decisions in the problem-solving situation. It focuses 
specifically on the following aspects of critical thinking: (1) identifying, 
interpreting and synthesising information from multiple sources to reach a 
conclusion; (2) evaluating the acceptability and reasonability of information; and 
(3) using information in producing explanations, decisions and arguments. 
Personal epistemology is seen here as students’ conceptions about the nature of 
knowledge and knowing (i.e. the definition, content, justification and sources of 
knowledge), including personal beliefs about themselves as knowers. Recently, 
Harvey Siegel criticised the use of the term epistemology in science education; he 
(2014, 372) emphasised that “‘epistemology’ is the name of that branch of 
philosophy dedicated to the theory of Knowledge.”5 Therefore, I prefer the term 
conceptions of knowledge rather than epistemological beliefs or personal 
epistemology. I use term personal epistemology to refer the research tradition of 
personal epistemology. 
 
 
                                                        
5 Similarly, in the contexts of personal epistemology some researches have stated that they 
prefer the term epistemic rather than epistemological because “epistemological relates to 
the study of epistemology“(Barzilai & Zohar, 2012, 41; see also Kitchener, 2002). 
  
 
 
  
  
   
  
The present thesis is based on four original publications, which are referred to in 
the text by Roman numerals (Studies I–IV). The general aim of the thesis is to 
deepen understanding of the nature of critical thinking by combining theoretical, 
empirical and methodological perspectives. More specifically, the focus of this 
research is threefold: 
Firstly, the theoretical aim is to clarify the empirically-based theorisation6 of 
critical thinking (Studies I & II). The purpose is to offer new, sustainable, insights 
into conceptualising critical thinking and its prerequisites, especially knowledge 
and knowing. The nature of knowledge and knowing has been discussed by 
educational psychologists exploring personal epistemology as well as by 
philosophers. As noted above, these two strong research traditions have remained 
relatively separate. Educational psychologists focus on empirical evidence 
concerning students’ conception of knowledge; philosophers focus on theories of 
the conditions of knowledge. The present study sets out to identify conceptual 
differences and similarities between the research traditions of educational 
psychology and philosophy as well as to integrate these viewpoints where 
appropriate. I assume that although empirical research on personal epistemology 
and philosophical research on the conditions of knowledge are two different fields 
of study, these traditions have shared concerns. In particular, normative 
assumptions concerning individuals’ conceptions of knowledge and critical 
thinking would benefit from the theoretical and conceptual analysis used in 
philosophical epistemology (i.e. what kind of critical thinking or conception of 
knowledge is worth pursuing in the first place).  
Secondly, the empirical focus of this study is to examine and describe 
qualitative differences in students’ critical thinking skills in a specific problem-
solving situation (Studies II, III & IV), and to analyse the interconnections 
between students’ conceptions of knowledge and their critical thinking skills 
(Study II). The aim is to bring the theoretical insights into dialogue with empirical 
elaboration. The empirical part of this doctoral thesis combines theoretical and 
methodological perspectives and thereby endeavours to bring forth new empirical 
data on critical thinking and conceptions of knowledge and extend understanding 
of the variations in critical thinking.  
Thirdly, the methodological aim is to enhance understanding of the important 
role of the analysis method (Studies II & IV) and explore the critical role of the 
type of assessment instrument selected to measure students’ critical thinking 
(Studies II & IV). In the area of critical thinking, previous studies have more often 
                                                        
6 Theoretical formulations are based on empirical research findings. 
 compared the results of self-reports and performance-based assessments (e.g. 
Bowman, 2010; Bowman & Seifert, 2011). These studies have shown that self-
reports and performance assessments measure different aspects of students’ 
abilities and therefore yield different pictures of those abilities. Study IV addresses 
this issue by comparing the test results of two different performance-based critical 
thinking tests. The aim is to explore how closely the measures of the two critical 
thinking tests are aligned. A strong variance in the test results would have 
profound implications, as this would mean that the form of assessment 
substantially affects the findings about student outcomes (Bowman, 2010). 
Information about the differences between various performance assessment 
instruments is valuable for interpreting the results of critical thinking tests.  
The present thesis utilises a multi-method approach (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie 
& Turner, 2007), including think-aloud protocol, interviews, performance tasks 
and a multiple-choice questionnaire, to explore the complex connections between 
critical thinking and conceptions of knowledge in a specific problem-solving 
situation. 
Theoretical questions: 
A1 To what extent does empirical research on personal epistemology and 
philosophical analysis of the conditions of knowledge relate to each other? 
A2 What new perspectives does the philosophical understanding of the conditions 
of knowledge offer empirical research on the conception of knowledge? 
 
Empirical questions: 
B1 How is critical thinking presented in a specific problem-solving situation? How 
does it vary from one individual to another? 
? How do students process and approach problems and solve them? 
? What kinds of knowledge do students use to solve problems? 
? How do students analyse, evaluate, synthesise and interpret that 
knowledge? 
? How do students utilise that knowledge in producing arguments and 
counter-arguments? 
? How do students come to a conclusion and validate their conclusions?  
B2 How do the conceptions of knowledge vary from one individual to another?  
B3 How are students’ conceptions of knowledge linked with critical thinking? 
 
Methodological question: 
C1 How do the analysis method and the type of assessment instruments influence 
the findings of students’ critical thinking? 
  
This section presents an overview of the context and methodological choices of the 
four studies. The content of each study is explained in detail in the original 
publications. 
Holma, K., & Hyytinen H. (equal contribution) (in press). The philosophy of 
personal epistemology. Theory and Research in Education. 
Study I analysed the theoretical background assumptions of personal 
epistemology (henceforth PE). Previous research on PE has provided evidence 
that an individual’s epistemological positions influence learning, critical thinking 
and academic success (Kuhn, 2005; Schommer-Aikins & Easter, 2006; Hofer & 
Pintrich, 2002; King & Kitchener, 2004). Several scholars in the tradition of PE 
have endeavoured to analyse and describe the relationship between psychological 
and philosophical epistemology (e.g. Greene et al., 2008, 2010; Muis, 2004; Muis 
et al., 2006; Murphy, 2003; Southerland et al., 2001). However, it has been noted 
that the connection between these two research fields is still not clear (Buckland, 
2010; Chinn et al., 2011). Murphy, Alexander and Muis (2012) have recently 
argued that a deeper understanding of the nature and conditions of knowledge is 
needed in research on PE.  
The aim of Study I was twofold. Firstly, the study set out to identify the 
conceptual differences between the research traditions of educational psychology 
and those of philosophy, as well as to integrate appropriate viewpoints. Secondly, 
the aim was to explain the conceptual inconsistencies of personal epistemology 
from a philosophical point of view and suggest a remedy for solving these 
problems within the prevailing theoretical framework of PE. The study utilised a 
systematic analysis (Holma, 2009; Hyytinen, 2011), which is a common analytical 
method in the philosophy of education. This kind of theoretical analysis 
endeavours to build a bridge between theory and practice by “combining 
philosophical ways of analysing and arguing with the dialogical and pluralist way 
of thinking needed in educational research” (Holma, 2009, 325). I conducted this 
study with Dr. Katariina Holma, and we made equal contributions. Next I will 
explain the methodological choices of Study I. It is important to note that these 
aspects are not traditionally explicated in philosophically-orientated texts. That is 
the reason why a method section is missing from the original publication.  
The theoretical analysis can be described as “a thoroughgoing process of 
analysis and synthesis” (Holma, 2009, 325). The phases of analysis are described 
 in Figure 4. The analytical process focused on the normative elements of PE and 
it was divided into two main phases—analysis and dialogue. During the first phase 
the analytical perspectives were determined and the texts selected. We chose 
pioneering and classic studies and hierarchical models of PE, as well as other 
articles that make pedagogical recommendations for developing students’ 
conceptions of knowledge. To ensure that the selected texts generated an overview 
of the personal epistemology literature, the relevant texts were also sought in the 
electronic databases ISI, EBSCO, Proquest and Scopus. The following keywords 
and phrases were combined in searching for texts in these databases: 
"epistemological belie*", "personal epistemolog*", "nature of knowledge", 
epistemic*, "epistemological assumption*", "epistemic thinking*", "epistemo-
logical belie*", knowledge, knowing, "higher education", college*, university, 
"university student*". The search through the databases was limited to articles 
published in international, academic, peer-reviewed journals. Furthermore, the 
snowball method was used to identify the relevant texts. The final database 
consisted of the following texts: 55 journal articles (including reviews, theoretical 
and empirical articles) and 4 books. 
All the texts were read through, and the relevant terms, concepts, definitions, 
claims and conclusions among them were identified. We focused on the following 
aspects: a definition of PE, theoretical variants of hierarchical models of PE, 
relativism, evaluativism, realism, absolutism, truth, objectivity and certainty. The 
aim was to understand these concepts as they were used in this particular context. 
At the same time the interconnections of the concepts as well as contradictory 
statements and inconsistencies were observed. We compared, among other 
things, the theoretical variants in PE and definitions of the above-mentioned 
concepts. Our aim was to condense the meaning and interrelations of the key 
concepts that are crucial for understanding the PE debate. The last phase of the 
analysis was reconstruction. Here we considered solutions to several theoretical 
inconsistencies identified in the analysis. The aim of the second main phase—the 
last phase of the systematic analysis—was to introduce the findings into a broader 
educational conversation and endorse a constructive dialogue between the 
research traditions of educational psychology and those of philosophy.  
  
 
Hyytinen, H., Holma, K., Toom, A., Shavelson, R. J., & Lindblom-Ylänne, S. 
(2014). The complex relationship between students’ critical thinking and 
epistemological beliefs in the context of problem solving. Frontline Learning 
Research 6: 1–15. 
Study II utilised a multi-method approach in order to identify and describe 
qualitative differences in students’ critical thinking skills and to explore the 
connection between critical thinking and the conception of knowledge in a specific 
problem-solving situation. The target population for this study consisted of the 
entire class of third-year bioscience students in a certain Finnish university. 
Firstly, 40 students were selected at random (approximately one-half of the target 
population). All the students selected were then invited to participate in the study. 
Ten of the 40 volunteered. Seven of the participants were female and three were 
male. The students’ ages varied from 22 to 29, the mean age being 24. All came 
from a homogeneous cultural background, and all shared the same first language 
 (Finnish). In addition, the students had equivalent national high school certificate 
and had enrolled in the same bachelor’s study programme. The participants were 
at the same phase of their studies, that is, near the end of their bachelor’s degree, 
with the exception of one student whose study pace had been slower. During their 
university careers, the students had participated in lectures, practical laboratories, 
seminars, field courses and web-based teaching. The purpose of Study II was to 
deepen understanding of the critical thinking and conceptions of knowledge 
among university students in order to describe how these phenomena varied 
among individuals in this specific group. 
For Study II a large body of data for each participant was collected using a 
multi-method approach (Johnson, Onwuegbuzie, & Turner, 2007), including 
think-aloud protocol, interviews and a Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA) 
performance task (the latter is described in more detail below). The CLA 
performance task was the same as in Study IV. The data collection was carried out 
in the spring of 2010 and consisted of ten cognitive labs. The students came to a 
classroom and were given the details of the study. They then spent two to three 
hours reading and responding to the performance task. In responding to the task, 
the students were asked to verbalise their thoughts (to think aloud). In the course 
of carrying out the task while thinking aloud, the students were also asked to write 
a memorandum addressing critical issues in the task and recommending—and 
justifying—a course of action. Following the task, the students were interviewed 
about their processes in carrying out the task. Students were also asked questions 
about the learning of critical thinking and how they understood the nature of 
knowledge and knowing. 
The cognitive-lab data were analysed using thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 
2006) with an abductive approach (Timmermans & Tavory, 2012; Haig, 2005). 
An abductive strategy means that the themes identified in the data were linked to 
theoretical understanding based on previous studies. Abduction is a process that 
combines things which were not previously associated by creating a new 
interpretation, that is, the relationship of a new combination of study features 
(Timmermans & Tavory, 2012). Hence, the analytical process was nonlinear, 
moving back and forth among all the data, data items, analysed qualities and 
understanding of the phenomenon based on prior studies. The analysis included 
four phases (Figure 5) representing the unique combination of data-grounded and 
theory-driven phases, as well as group-level and individual-level analyses. In the 
analysis investigator triangulation (Denzin, 1970, 2012; Creswell & Miller, 2000) 
was utilised to confirm the reliability of the findings. 
  
 
 
During the first phase, video recordings were initially indexed with the ELAN 
programme, which allows the addition of as many tiers and annotations in the 
video stream as needed (see Lausberg & Sloetjes, 2009; Max Planck Institute for 
Psycholinguistics, 2012). The purpose of indexing was to make the large video data 
set easier to handle. In this study the indexing tiers corresponded to the parts of 
cognitive labs including training, think-aloud methods and interviews. In 
addition, students’ interviews on the videos were transcribed. After the indexing, 
content logs were created for each video in which accurate descriptions and 
 summaries of events were systematically recorded. Transcriptions of relevant 
sections of verbalisations of students’ critical thinking and conceptions of 
knowledge (e.g. whenever a student evaluated the quality and reliability of the 
information in a document or reached a conclusion based on her or his analysis) 
and nonverbal acts (e.g. a student did not read in detail or skipped over the 
document) were also included in the log.  
The second phase of the analysis was data coding (see Table 3 for definitions). 
This phase was theory-driven, meaning that the features guiding the coding were 
based on prior studies. The coding focused on the following qualities: the process 
by which the student approached the task and solved the problem, the knowledge 
that the student used to carry out the task, the critical thinking exhibited, and the 
conceptions of knowledge. These different qualities were coded systematically 
across the entire data set and within the data items, such as the transcribed 
interviews and the think-aloud videos of each person. By this means, all the data 
items from one student, including the video data, content log, written test answers 
and transcribed interviews, were coded and analysed separately, after which the 
data from all the students were combined and compared (see Table 4 for an 
example of the codes). All extracts were labelled with a student code (S1-S10) and 
a method code (I= interview, T=think aloud, W= written test answer). 
  
  
 
  
  
?
 
 
In the third phase the codes and coded extracts were grouped under potential 
themes, and all the relevant data were gathered under each theme (Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). The aim was to identify themes which capture a holistic picture of 
a phenomenon. A variety of preliminary themes were identified on the basis of the 
codes. During the analysis, the preliminary themes were defined and combined 
several times. In the end two main themes and two subthemes remained (see 
Figure 5). The final themes were refined, labelled and cross-checked to see if they 
worked in relation to the coded extracts and the entire data set. The focus of the 
thematic analysis was the variation of study features on the phenomenon level. 
After completing the thematic analysis, I found that the students could be placed 
in one of several profiles based on our themes as well as on the patterns of 
behaviour and cognition observed. This phase focused on the variation in study 
features at the individual level. Thereafter, final descriptions, interpretations and 
revisions of the results were conducted.  
  
 Hyytinen, H., Löfström, E., & Lindblom-Ylänne, S. (2015). Challenges in 
argumentation and paraphrasing among beginning students in educational 
science. Manuscript submitted for publication. 
Study III aimed to identify difficulties in writing at the beginning of educational 
science programmes in the Finnish Open University by analysing the students’ 
written argumentation and use of sources at the textual level. Study III focused on 
common problems identified in the review of the literature (Darab, 2006; 
Jurowska & Thompson, 2012; Keinonen & Kärkkäinen, 2010; Sandoval, 2009), 
such as using sources and constructing solid arguments, and it attempted to 
understand how paraphrasing and argumentation are problematic for higher 
education students. Even though there are many field-specific conventions in 
academic writing, it is also possible to identify similarities in texts at the micro 
level: we can analyse the construction of a solid argument (Walton, 1990, 1995) 
and the nature of source citation if we have the original source at our disposal. 
The participants were 138 new students in educational science (117 women and 
21 men) attending a Finnish Open University (see below). These students had 
diverse educational backgrounds: 23 per cent of the participants had university 
degrees (a bachelor’s, master’s, or doctoral degree); 36 per cent had a polytechnic 
degree; 16 percent had completed vocational upper-secondary education; and 25 
per cent had a general upper-secondary education before undertaking educational 
science studies. Thus, not all students were beginners in the sense that they were 
unfamiliar with university study. However, all students were beginning students 
in educational science. Their ages varied from 20 to 64, the mean age being 35. 
 Finnish Open Universities, which provided the context for Study III, are part 
of the Finnish university system. Almost all Finnish universities provide Open 
University education in co-operation with their departments and faculties. Open 
Universities are thus not autonomous institutions. They offer university-level 
study for everyone, regardless of age or educational background. Course content 
and criteria for assessing learning outcomes are equivalent to the teaching at the 
affiliated university. However, Finnish Open Universities do not award academic 
degrees. In the year 2011, over 43,000 individuals attended Open University 
courses in Finland (Statistics Finland 2012). Many Open University students are 
adults who want to develop their potential in general or expand their knowledge 
in a specific subject. Another group of Open University students consists of 
graduates of upper-secondary school who seek to improve their chances of being 
admitted to the university as a regular student, either by taking courses in their 
subject of interest or by taking basic level courses that provide an alternative route 
to university admission. Educational sciences, for instance, offer such an 
alternative route.  
 The students’ writing was assessed using the CLA performance task. The task 
was translated into Finnish and adapted to a Finnish context. The adaptation and 
translation process followed the same detailed protocols as Studies II and IV (see 
Appendix A) to ensure consistency among Studies II, III and IV. The CLA 
performance task is designed to measure general academic skills, such as critical 
and analytical thinking, problem-solving and written communication (Klein et al., 
2007; Shavelson, 2010). The CLA performance task requires students to apply 
critical thinking and written communication skills, and it endeavours to measure 
“general skill-based competencies, rather than academic aptitude, general 
intelligence, or subject- and content-specific skills” (Arum & Roksa, 2011a, 147; 
see also Shavelson, 2010). The questions and other materials in the CLA 
performance task were not specialised, thus ensuring that the work could be 
completed by students from a variety of disciplines. The task simulated several 
aspects of academic writing and included instructions, four open-ended questions 
and reading material about a fictitious, but realistic societal problem. In order to 
respond, the students needed to (a) organise, synthesise, assess and analyse 
information (which might be reliable/unreliable or relevant/irrelevant to the 
task); (b) identify judgemental errors, such as ‘correlation proves causation’ from 
several sources (email correspondence, memoranda, research abstracts, research 
reports, newspaper articles, statistics, etc.); (c) make a reasoned explanation for a 
problem and propose a solution; and (d) write arguments and counter-arguments 
for and against a particular solution using information from the reading material 
(Shavelson, 2010). Students had 90 minutes to complete the task. The 
instructions and each sub-question advised them to cite sources as well as justify 
their positions. 
The data for Study III were analysed using qualitative content analysis. The 
analytical process was divided into five phases (see Figure 6). In the first phase, 
the first and second authors read the students’ texts through several times 
independently to obtain a sense of the whole and make notes on relevant 
information. Thereafter, the definition of coding features was negotiated jointly. 
In the second phase, the first author coded the data using the ATLAS.ti 
programme. This phase was theory-driven, meaning that the features of coding 
were based on prior studies. In analysing the argumentation, the coding 
concentrated on the following aspects: (1) the conclusion and (2) the reasons and 
claim(s) that students used as evidence to support the conclusion. In a solid 
argument, claims warrant “conclusion by providing good reasons for them” 
(Siegel & Biro, 1997, 278). In order to identify problems in paraphrasing and citing 
references and fallacious arguments, we used the referencing problems identified 
by Walker (2010) and the argumentation schemes defined by Walton (1995). 
Furthermore, we utilised the findings of thematic analysis from Study II. In the 
third phase the codes were grouped into categories and sub-categories. The 
 purpose of grouping the data was to classify similar or related coded phenomena 
in the same category (see Elo & Kyngäs 2007; Mayring, 2000). Thereafter, 
categories were defined and reviewed, and a final description and interpretation 
were generated. The abstraction process and the final categories are described in 
Table 5. Altogether three categories of problems in argumentation and five 
categories of referencing problems were identified. In the last phase, the 
occurrence of the categories throughout the data set was examined and a cross-
tabulation of the categories generated. The students’ texts were then divided into 
three groups. 
  
 
  
 
 
Hyytinen, H., Nissinen, K., Ursin, J., Toom, A., & Lindblom-Ylänne, S. (2015). 
Problematising the equivalence of the test results of performance-based 
critical thinking tests for undergraduate students. Studies in Educational 
Evaluation 44: 1–8. doi:10.1016/j.stueduc.2014.11.001 
The main goals of Study IV were to explore the critical role of the type of 
assessment instrument and enhance understanding of the importance of the 
analytical method. Study IV compared the test results of two different 
performance-based assessments of critical thinking used in OECD’s AHELO 
(Assessment of Higher Education Learning Outcomes) Feasibility Study: a 
 constructed-response task from the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA) 7 
developed by the Council for Aid to Education (CAE) and a multiple-choice 
questionnaire (MCQ) from the Australian Council for Educational Research 
(ACER).8 These tests ostensibly measure the same critical thinking skills, such as 
analysing, interpreting and evaluating information and problem solving. The CLA 
task, intended specifically to evaluate reasoning, problem solving and written 
communication (Shavelson, 2010), presents a realistic problem and includes 
directions, open-ended questions and reading materials (such as letters, memos, 
summaries of research reports, articles, graphs, maps, interview notes). Some of 
the information is relevant, some is not. Students are expected to organise, 
analyse, synthesise and evaluate these multiple sources of information to arrive at 
a solution or an explanation of a problem (Klein et al., 2007; Shavelson, 2010). 
The MCQ also requires students to analyse, evaluate, interpret information and 
solve problems representing real-world perspectives. However, ACER’s MCQ 
“does not attempt to assess real-world performance directly” (ACER, 2001, 1). 
MCQ includes several questions followed by four response options, and students 
arrive at a decision by selecting a correct answer from these alternatives.  
The material for this study consisted of AHELO data collected in Finland in the 
spring of 2012. A total of 330 higher education students at the end of their 
bachelor’s degree studies participated. Half the students were university students 
and the rest came from polytechnics. The Finnish higher education system 
consists of both, universities and polytechnics. Universities focus on scholarly 
research on which the education they provide is based. Polytechnics emphasise a 
more practical approach and have close links to the labour market. Their mission 
is to train professionals for working life as well as to participate in new product 
design and development. Finnish polytechnics and universities enjoy extensive 
autonomy. It follows that higher education institutions are free to decide on 
student selection and to design the contents of their degree programmes (Ministry 
of Education and Culture, 2015a). Higher education is publicly funded in Finland 
and free of charge for students. The general target time for completing a bachelor’s 
degree is three years at the universities and from three and half to four years at 
the polytechnics. Student selection for higher education is based on previous 
academic achievement (i.e. success on matriculation examinations) and entrance 
examinations. Students come to higher education through various routes. Some 
continue their tertiary studies immediately after upper-secondary school. Others 
                                                        
7 An example of a CLA task is available in the AHELO report, volume 1 (see Tremblay et al., 
2012: 220−236). See also Figure 2. The CLA performance task is proprietary and 
consequently cannot be described in further detail here. 
8 The specific MCQ used in this study is proprietary and consequently cannot be described 
in further detail here. An example of the MCQ sample items is available on the website 
www.acer.edu.au/documents/CRT-OnlineSampleQuestions.pdf. 
 apply for higher education from working life. The Finnish educational system has 
no dead-ends, meaning that it is possible for students to progress from one level 
of education to the next or return to education later in life (Ministry of Education 
and Culture, 2015b).  
Although the MCQ and the CLA focus on many of the same critical thinking 
skills, they entail different uses of these skills. The MCQ asks students to recognise 
a correct answer from a set of response options using critical thinking, whereas 
the CLA, with its open-ended tasks, asks students to synthesise information and 
produce an answer in their own words. In addition, each item on the MCQ is 
devised to measure a single dimension of critical thinking, whereas the CLA is 
based on the idea that critical thinking cannot be divided and measured in single 
dimensions (see further in Shavelson, 2010). However, according to the AHELO 
report, both assessments measure core cognitive skills (Tremblay et al., 2012). 
Study IV explored how the test results of the CLA and the MCQ align. It focused 
on the differences in the test scores both at the group level and at the individual 
level. A strong variance in the test results would call into question whether or not 
these assessments measure the same underlying dimensions of critical thinking 
(Bowman & Seifert, 2011; Rodriguez, 2003). Contradictory test results would also 
have profound implications, as this would indicate that the type of measure has a 
great influence on a student’s outcome (Bowman, 2010).  
The computer delivered and invigilated a test situation lasting a maximum of 
150 minutes in which the students first had 90 minutes for the CLA and then 30 
minutes for the MCQ. At the end of the session the students filled in a short 
background questionnaire. Students could not proceed to the background 
questionnaire in less than 120 minutes unless they had responded to all questions, 
first on the CLA and then on the MCQ. The students’ CLA responses were 
evaluated for Analytical Reasoning and Evaluation (ARE), Problem Solving (PS) 
and Writing Effectiveness (WE) based on detailed criteria by two trained scorers 
using a scale of 1 to 6. An example of the scoring criteria is included in Appendix 
B. On the multi-choice questionnaire the administered items were randomly 
divided into four subtests with 23 or 24 items each. The translation, adaptation 
and validation process of the AHELO test instruments is explained in more detail 
in the AHELO report (Tremblay et al., 2012; see also Appendix A). 
 Study IV was based on the materials of the AHELO study including the raw 
data as well as the test scores. The data were analysed using a mixed-method 
strategy, integrating both quantitative and qualitative analyses (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Onwuegbuzie, Johnson, & Collins, 2009). The analysis of 
Study IV consisted of three phases (see Figure 7). In the first phase, quantitative 
statistical analyses focused on the relationship between the CLA and MCQ scores 
at the group level. Pearson correlation coefficients were employed in examining 
the association between the scores. Differences of score means were tested by the 
 paired t-test. In this phase students were classified into performance groups on 
the basis of the test scores. The first phase thus informed the second by providing 
a framework from which to select cases for further analysis. 
The second phase of the analysis explored the differences between the MCQ 
and CLA scores at the individual level, meaning that a unit of analysis was an 
individual student. By analysing the entire data set, we endeavoured to determine 
whether individual students’ test performance on the MCQ and the CLA differed 
(cf. Lindblom-Ylänne, Parpala, & Postareff, 2013). In this phase students were 
classified into performance groups on the basis of their test scores. The individual 
level analysis showed that some students had completely opposite test results. In 
the next phase we selected these opposite test responses (n= 32) for qualitative 
analysis. The second phase thus informed the third phase by providing a 
framework from which to select cases for further analysis. The students who had 
completely dissonant test scores could be divided into two groups. This phase 
focused on analysing the raw data. Before proceeding to the qualitative analyses 
of the CLA responses, we examined each student’s MCQ answers carefully and 
identified the range of correct, wrong and unanswered items.  
The qualitative analysis of CLA responses was divided into several phases. In 
the first phase students’ answers were read through several times. The second 
phase was data coding. This phase was theory-driven, meaning that the features 
of coding were based on prior studies. In order to examine and identify 
argumentation in a more detailed way than was done in the original scoring, we 
used the argumentation schemes identified by Walton (1995). Furthermore, we 
utilised our findings of thematic analysis (Study II) and content analysis (Study 
III). The coding focused on the following qualities of critical thinking: (1) 
identifying, interpreting and synthesising information from multiple sources to 
reach a conclusion; (2) evaluating the acceptability of information; and (3) 
producing explanations and arguments. These various qualities were coded 
systematically within each test response. Then the similar or related coded 
phenomena were grouped together. Thereafter, a short description of each 
student’s CLA response was written. After that, the differences between and 
within dissonant groups were identified. In the last phase a final description and 
interpretation were generated. All the authors collaborated on the analyses. In the 
analysis we utilised investigator triangulation (Denzin, 1970, 2012; Creswell & 
Miller, 2000) to confirm the reliability of the findings.  
The aims, measures, and data analyses of Studies I–IV are summarised in  
Table 6. 
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In this chapter, the main findings of the doctoral thesis are presented and 
discussed. The first section introduces the theoretical findings. The second section 
presents information relating to the empirical findings, and the last section 
presents the methodological results.  
 
 
Study I analysed to what extent empirical research on PE and philosophical 
analysis of the conditions of knowledge relate to each other. Contrary to the claims 
of many advocates of PE (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997; Kitchener, 2011; Southerland et 
al., 2001), the results of the theoretical analyses suggested that PE cannot be 
understood merely in descriptive terms, but clearly involves normative elements. 
Study I emphasised the importance of the distinction between normativity 
(how things ought to be) and descriptivity (how things are). In other words, on the 
basis of a philosophical analysis alone, one cannot say how things are in the real 
world (i.e. how human beings see and understand the nature of knowledge or 
construct their systems of belief), while on the basis of an empirical analysis one 
cannot say how things ought to be (i.e. what kind of personal epistemology is 
sophisticated or is worth pursuing in the first place). Thus, if we are interested in 
understanding the most adequate conception of knowledge, we need to consult 
philosophical research, and when we want to know what people actually think 
about knowledge and knowing, we should consult empirical research. Therefore, 
on the basis of empirical research alone, we cannot derive conclusions about the 
superiority of one conception of knowledge over another.  
According to Study I, the following three examples demonstrate that PE’s 
theoretical models include normative elements: 
1. PE’s theoretical models entail claims of superiority of some conceptions of 
knowledge over others. These models are clearly hierarchical, because they 
hold that some epistemological positions are more ‘sophisticated’ or 
‘higher’ than others (Kaartinen-Koutaniemi & Lindblom-Ylänne, 2012, 2; 
King & Kitchener, 1994, 2002, 2004; Kuhn, 1999, 2005; Perry, 1970; West, 
2004). This is to say that the PE theories maintain that there are 
differences in the adequacy and justifiability of students’ personal 
conceptions of knowledge and that PE’s hierarchical models represent this 
order of superiority. 
 2. Researchers have provided numerous educational recommendations 
based on empirical findings (i.e. Brownlee, 2004; Brownlee et al., 2009; 
Hofer, 2001, 2006b; King & Kitchener, 2002; Lahtinen & Pehkonen, 2013; 
Perry, 1970). As an example, Brownlee et al. (2009, 612) write: 
“[e]ssentially, we are advocating for pedagogy in higher education that is 
informed by personal epistemology rather than the implementation of 
particular teaching strategies per se. This new pedagogy requires a culture 
change in learning; one that engages us all in a more sophisticated way of 
knowing and learning in higher education”. 
3. The PE theories assume that a change in students’ conceptions of 
knowledge can be interpreted as development from lower (less adequate) 
to higher (more adequate) conceptions (i.e. Kuhn, 2005; Hofer & Pintrich, 
1997). As Pintrich (2002, 400) puts it: “there is fairly high agreement on 
the nature of developmental change. Again, at some level, all the models 
represented in this volume are in line with the proposition that an 
individual’s thinking about epistemological issues not only changes over 
time, but that it develops towards a more sophisticated perspective or 
stance toward knowledge and knowing”. However, there is always the 
possibility of some kind of adaptation instead of genuine development, at 
least from a theoretical point of view. It is possible, for example, that 
students have learned from their teachers what would be the most 
adequate way to think about knowledge and have adopted this view 
regardless of its real epistemological benefits. 
As noted before, normative elements belong to the field of philosophy. It is thus 
justifiable to analyse the normative elements of PE in the light of philosophical 
understanding. It is worth mentioning that, in the language of philosophy, if a 
researcher does not recognise the normative nature of some parts of the theory—
and interprets these as descriptive—she or he commits the naturalist fallacy.9 To 
be exact, on the basis of an empirical analysis one cannot say how things ought to 
be. For example, if the researcher finds relativist features in the empirical data, it 
does not imply that relativism is an epistemologically justifiable position or that it 
should be enhanced by teaching.  
 
Study I suggested that there are different interpretations of the concept of 
relativism among PE scholars, and it appears that the interpretations are not all 
                                                        
9 Fallacies are “failures of rationality” (Siegel & Biro, 1997, 278). The naturalistic fallacy by 
which one derives ‘ought’ from ‘is’ refers to a situation in which a person makes claims 
about what ought to be on the basis of statements about what is or vice versa. 
 necessarily relativistic in its ultimate form. Some researchers state that relativism 
is a view that understands knowledge as “contingent and contextual” (Hofer, 
2000, 379; see also Briell et al., 2013, 482), whereas others interpret relativism as 
referring to the idea that “everyone has a right to his or her opinion, all opinions 
are equally right”10 (Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002, 123; see also Hofer, 2005). These 
interpretations differ so fundamentally from each other that some of them do not 
appear to be epistemologically relativistic at all, whereas others cannot be 
interpreted in any other way.  
It is therefore important to distinguish three positions, all labelled relativistic 
in the context of PE: 1) knowledge is context-dependent in a weak sense, 2) 
knowledge is context-dependent in a strong sense, 3) all beliefs are equally right. 
The first position states that particular human beliefs, statements and theories can 
be understood only in relation to some context, and they cannot be directly 
compared, say, with the facts of independent reality. This position does not 
necessitate relativism, but actually is a better fit with epistemological fallibilism. 
In the second case beliefs, statements and theories can be evaluated only in 
relation to some context, but outside this context, nothing can be said of their 
credibility and justifiability. This position is a version of (modest) relativism. 
Finally, the position that all opinions are equally right is, of course, a version of 
relativism in its ultimate form.  
As noted before, the essential problem of a modest and ultimate form of 
relativism is that we cannot be incorrect, since relativism admits no criteria for 
evaluating our beliefs and theories. To put it simply, in the context of relativism 
there is no need to evaluate ideas or search for alternatives, because all ideas are 
equally trustworthy and justifiable. This is worth noting also in relation to 
Kember’s (2001, 217) aforementioned connection of relativism with the possibility 
of critical thinking. Along the lines of the previous argument, within the 
framework of epistemological relativism, critical thinking is altogether pointless. 
If all beliefs and opinions are equally right, then why should one think critically? 
Study I argued that the learning aim of critical thinking is conceptually connected 
with the epistemological ideal of rationality (cf. Scheffler, 1973). Rationality as 
well as its development through teaching requires having some criteria for 
evaluating beliefs, conceptions and theories. Furthermore, relativism undermines 
the possibility of teaching at the general level as well. If all knowledge is equally 
valid, then teachers have no criteria with which to assess students’ understanding; 
students are free to hold whatever beliefs or positions they want. Nor is it justified, 
within the relativist framework, to assume that a teacher has some sort of 
epistemic authority (Kotzee, 2010). We actually cannot justifiably reject any 
competing presumptions as false. 
                                                        
10 Emphasis added. 
  
Study I argued that there are several other conceptual inconsistencies in the PE 
literature. For instance, PE does not sufficiently distinguish between the 
epistemological notions of objectivity, certainty and truth. Study I suggested that 
these conceptual inconsistencies are connected with a deeper problem: the 
theoretical framework of PE does not identify the concept of epistemological 
fallibilism. Fallibilism implies that human knowledge is uncertain (Reed, 2002; 
Niiniluoto, 1999; Holma, 2012). However, it does not imply that all beliefs, 
conceptions or theories are equally right. In contrast to relativism, it thus 
presumes the possibility of improving our current conceptions, theories or beliefs, 
seeking criteria for evaluating, comparing and justifying these beliefs or theories 
(Holma, 2012; Holma & Hyytinen, in press-a, in press-b; Peirce, 1934a. 1934b). In 
philosophical discussion epistemological fallibilism is often committed to the idea 
of realism, which states that reality exists independent of human beings. 
In previous studies of PE, epistemological notions of objectivity and certainty 
are often tied and connected with a naïve version of realism and absolutism. Naïve 
realism is an epistemological position that assumes that “our knowledge and 
symbol systems [i.e. theories] directly reflect the structure of reality” (Holma, 
2004, 421; Putnam, 1981). The PE literature seems to understand realism as naïve 
realism (see e.g. Kuhn 2005; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002), and furthermore appears 
to connect with naïve realism the assumption of there being a possibility of the 
certainty of human knowledge (i.e. absolutism). Hilary Putman describes this kind 
of realism as metaphysical realism (Putnam 1978, 1981). As King and Kitchener 
(2004, 7) put it, knowledge is “obtained with certainty by direct observation”.11 
Also within this framework, critical thinking turns out to be pointless, because 
human knowledge directly copies reality.  
However, the possibility of objectivity implies neither the possibility of 
certainty nor the idea that our beliefs are direct copies of external reality. Contrary 
to the absolute nature of certainty, objectivity is best understood as a matter of 
degree. It follows that individuals’ descriptions of reality can be more or less 
objective, depending on the adequate use of evidence and reasons. At one end of 
the continuum are the merely subjective beliefs, while at the other end are the 
beliefs based on all the relevant evidence and reasons (Holma, 2011, 536). 
Theories of science, for example, strive to approach the highest level of objectivity. 
But even a theory that has reached the highest level of objectivity could never be 
assumed to be certain.  
                                                        
11 King and Kitchener (2004) do not call the lowest level of reflective thinking realism. 
However, in their model they maintain that, at the most limited level of thinking, 
knowledge is certain and is obtained from direct observation (King & Kitchener, 2004, 7). 
This position fits naïve realism. 
 The theoretical analyses in Study I pointed out that without fallibilism, several 
PE theorists have considered the only alternative to relativism as being some kind 
of naïve version of realism (i.e. human beliefs are direct copies of reality) and 
epistemological absolutism (i.e. that human knowledge can achieve certainty) 
(e.g. Kuhn, 2005, 30; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002, 124; Kuhn et al., 2000; see also 
King & Kitchener, 2004). One can agree that in comparison with these views of 
realism and absolutism, relativism may indeed seem a sophisticated 
epistemological position. However, although many contemporary philosophers 
defend realism (Niiniluoto, 1999), none of them accepts the view that human 
beliefs are direct copies of reality, nor that human beliefs could be certain. Realism 
means only that reality exists independent of human beings. Different variants of 
realism may disagree both in relation to what part of reality exists independent of 
human beings and to what extent the reliable knowledge can be acquired about 
reality. In the philosophical literature realism implies neither the certainty of 
human knowledge nor the idea that human beliefs are direct copies of reality.  
Study I argued that naïve realism and epistemological absolutism are not the 
only alternatives to relativism. Study I also introduced the concept of fallibilism 
as an epistemologically justifiable alternative to solve the above-mentioned 
conceptual inconsistencies, because it preserves the benefits that PE identifies 
with relativism without slipping into relativism (i.e. which claims that it is not 
possible to evaluate, compare and improve our conceptions) or into conceptual 
problems in terms of the notion of absolutism (i.e. which claims that some sources 
of certainty or fixed starting points exist on which to base our search for 
understanding). In other words, fallibilism differs from relativism by not taking 
all beliefs, conceptions or theories as being either equally right or right merely in 
relation to some context, but allows us to seek the criteria for evaluating, 
comparing and justifying our beliefs, theories and conceptions. Fallibilism can 
further be considered as a responsible epistemic position, because it admits to the 
uncertainty knowledge, but does not end up with the relativist conclusion that all 
beliefs are equal. Fallibilism, by accepting the uncertainty of all human 
knowledge, can also be seen as a psychologically mature view of knowledge. As PE 
scholars King and Kitchener (2004, 9) have themselves written, clearly in a 
fallibilist spirit:  
Reflective thinkers consistently and comfortably use evidence and reason in 
support of their judgements. They argue that knowledge claims must be 
understood in relation to the context in which they were generated, but that 
they can be evaluated for their coherence and consistency with available 
information. Because new data or new perspectives may emerge as knowledge 
is constructed and reconstructed, individuals using assumptions of reflective 
thinking remain open to reevaluating their conclusion and knowledge claims. 
 The same conceptual inconsistencies appeared during the analytical process in 
Study II.12 I realised that Study II’s empirical data could not be explicated and 
interpreted in depth using previous PE models; in other words, the commonly 
used dimensions ranging from absolutist to relativism or evaluativist did not 
capture the variations in the students’ conceptions of knowledge. The 
philosophical assumptions of knowledge and knowing opened new insights into 
understanding the results of our analysis, especially the variations in students’ 
epistemological notions. Among other things, the results demonstrated that all 
students who participated in Study II shared a fallibilist view of knowledge. The 
concept of fallibilism is missing from the theoretical framework of PE. The 
empirical findings are discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
 
The empirical results of Study II suggested that students’ conceptions of 
knowledge were woven into their critical thinking: students used critical thinking 
as a tool for enhancing understanding or determining truth or falsehood. Based 
on this difference, students were classified in one of two profiles, either (1) 
thorough processing or (2) superficial processing. These profiles captured the 
diversity of the students’ skills and dispositions to think critically. In addition, 
these two profiles characterised the variation in how students determined what is 
needed to evaluate knowledge and how they justified, acquired and used the 
knowledge in the problem-solving situation. The same profile groups were also 
identified in Studies III and IV. These two profiles were not distinguishable by 
gender or educational background. 
The results showed that the students who palmed off justification for knowing on 
authoritative figures or scientific proof showed superficial processing: these 
students did not make a serious effort to analyse, evaluate, interpret or 
synthesise the information in the materials (Studies II & IV). This profile 
consisted of students who used critical thinking as an instrument for determining 
truth or falsehood. Their goal in the problem-solving situation was to find the right 
answer to the problem.  
                                                        
12 The findings of Study II were the starting point for the theoretical analysis of PE (Study 
I).  
 In Study II the superficial processing students thought that there was one 
definite answer to the problem. These students acquired knowledge through 
testimonies. They trusted in scientific proof as well as testimonies from 
authoritative specialists or experts. Students in this profile believed that 
knowledge is trustworthy only if it was produced through a reliable process, for 
example, by using empirical methods or consulting suitable experts. They 
considered scientific and verified knowledge to be the most reliable (i.e. to hold 
the highest epistemic status), because that kind of knowledge is based on 
evidence. They further believed that scientific knowledge is objective and 
therefore most often unbiased. However, in the problem-solving situation, they 
did not evaluate or interpret the empirical knowledge at all, nor did they consider 
presuppositions or the contextual nature of knowledge. For that reason, they did 
not recognise that some material for the task, which included empirical or verified 
knowledge, was biased. However, in the interview these students believed that 
empirical knowledge could be fallible too. They expressed the idea that some 
theories based on empirical knowledge might be false and that it is possible to 
improve current conceptions and theories. In contrast to earlier findings (e.g. 
Kaartinen-Koutaniemi & Lindblom-Ylänne, 2012; King & Kitchener, 2004; Kuhn, 
2005), the findings of Study II pointed out that the students who appealed to 
authorities did not consider knowledge as absolutely certain or irrefutable. Nor 
did these students share the view that beliefs accurately represent or correspond 
to reality. The students thus did not share a sense of absolutism, namely the idea 
that knowledge is certain. From the epistemological perspective, these students 
took the fallibilist position.  
In Study II some of the superficial processing students had serious difficulties 
evaluating the quality of information, because they did not consider themselves 
capable of evaluating knowledge. They believed that if a person who is said to be 
an authority on something makes an argument about that something, then the 
argument should be trustworthy and therefore usable. It follows that the right 
answers can be found by consulting the right expert. These students repeated the 
arguments and conclusions as these were presented in the documents. The 
students mentioned a few external criteria for evaluating knowledge (such as an 
authority, expert opinion, publication, openness, journal citations). However, in 
practice these students did not know how to use these criteria independently. The 
following example illustrates these uncertain knowers: 
I don’t know what the right approach is in order to grasp those overall 
concepts from that huge mass of teensy-weensy details. Because a candidate 
[for a bachelor’s thesis] has to read a huge number of articles to find the ones 
that are, like, related to one’s own topic and all. So it’s really hard when 
you’re, like, reading an article to judge why this one might be better than that 
one. So. But I got a tip from my supervisor that I should pay attention to the 
 reliability of the journal. To be honest, it’s the research articles, the ones we 
have at the university, that are actually the only ones we’re told we can cite. 
And then it’s like... they’re easy to evaluate based on which publications are 
more credible. And on the Web on [sic] Science, they have this one like... what 
is it, like an indicator that they have, just based on the number of citations 
and other factors, of the accuracy of the research data… It’s hard! In a way, 
to make that distinction between what’s true and what isn’t. At least I don’t 
have the know-how to say what’s true and what isn’t.    
(Study II, Student 5, interview) 
Further analysis demonstrated that the students in the superficial profile group 
provided isolated reasons and reproduced ideas (Studies II, III & IV). For 
example, their written responses were typically composed of reproduced or 
slightly modified portions of the source texts, meaning that the students had not 
explained the content of the materials in their own words. Superficial processing 
students identified only a few of the claims presented in the documents and 
disregarded many relevant aspects of those claims. They did not identify 
alternative solutions or conclusions or approaches to the problem. Nor did they 
provide any reasons or explanations for their own conclusions. As a result, they 
had problems reaching a conclusion. Furthermore, the analysis indicated several 
weaknesses in producing arguments. Common to all answers in this profile group 
was that the students provided vague arguments: they made claims or gave 
conclusions, but did not supply valid reasons or explanations to support their 
claims, thereby leaving their arguments weak. The following extract from Study 
IV describes a typical written response in the superficial processing profile 
(reproduced or slightly modified portions from the source texts are underlined): 
Question 1a: What specific information, evidence, facts and/or theories 
discussed in the Document Library support the inbreeding explanation? 
Document 6, transcription of the radio interview with Dr. Leusid 
QUESTION 1b: What are the arguments against the inbreeding explanation? 
In Document 2 Charles Stone writes that the catfish were found in the same 
pond that Bonaventure Mills poisoned to death 10 years ago. He thus blames 
the mills for what has happened. 
In Document 6 Thomas Leusid states that duplications of limbs in frogs and 
catfish are caused by a parasite. 
(Study IV, Student 28, written answers) 
 Some of these students had no disposition to use critical thinking skills in the test 
situation or in everyday life; as one student put it in the interview: 
In everyday life it’s rare that, if you’re discussing something, it’s rare that 
anything like this happens. Or I never, really rarely discuss anything 
argumentatively in any way. In real life I simply don’t like it, discussing 
issues.   
(Study II, Student 9, interview) 
The students who deeply analysed the content of the documents created their own 
understanding of the problem-solving situation (Studies II, III & IV). For them, 
critical-thinking skills were tools for deepening and enhancing understanding. 
These students believed that theories and beliefs could be understood in relation 
to some context, as the following extract from Study II shows: 
- - yeah, I don’t believe ?the chair of the stakeholder group] is completely off 
the mark either. [The reliability of] knowledge is just always context-specific. 
(Study II, Student 8, interview) 
Study II pointed out that these students considered it possible to improve current 
theories and beliefs. In the problem-solving situation, these students were open 
to new evidence that could disprove a previously-held position or belief. For them, 
scientific knowledge is probably reliable. They believed that both objective and 
subjective knowledge could attain the highest epistemic status, meaning that, for 
example, their own subjective perceptions or experiences could be a reliable 
source of knowledge. These students thought that the credibility of knowledge 
could be affected by vested interests or bias, for example. Although these students 
emphasised their own role in constructing their understanding, they did not 
believe that all knowledge is generated by human minds. In the problem-solving 
situation these students justified and enhanced their own understanding with 
reasoning. Besides reasoning, they considered intuition, testimonies, perceptions 
and experiences as possible sources of knowledge. These students saw that all 
human knowledge (i.e. theories, beliefs and conceptions) is fallible. However, the 
students did not argue that all knowledge is constructed by the knower nor did 
they believe that all interpretations, theories and beliefs are equally right. 
Therefore, they avoided slipping into relativism. From the epistemological 
perspective, these students also took the fallibilist position.  
Studies III and IV indicated that the thorough processing students evaluated 
the quality of the information and considered its premises, as well as the 
implications of different conclusions. They weighed different options, connected 
 related ideas and gave reasoned explanations. The following extract from Study 
IV describes a typical CLA written response in the thorough processing profile: 
Question 1a: What specific information, evidence, facts and/or theories 
discussed in the Document Library support the inbreeding explanation? 
Thomas Leusid says in his interview that many catfish are quite young—at 
most three years old, which strongly indicates that the catfish have come to this 
area only a short time ago, so it could not be about Db09-caused toxin 
concentration—especially since the Db09 toxin has not, according to Sandy 
Evans’ study as referred to by Dr. Munt, caused any mutations. In addition, 
Leusid’s research team has found some multiplied structures in the catfish 
populations of Miracle Lake, although the feature of three eyes had not been 
observed earlier. Leusid’s theory—that only a number of fertilised eggs have 
come to Bush Creek—is supported in particular by the fact that Bush Creek and 
Miracle Lake greatly restrict the mobility of fish, and adult catfish live at the 
bottom of waterways [and] are not likely to get across the rapids. 
QUESTION 1b: What are the arguments against the inbreeding explanation? 
Researcher Thomas Leusid had not seen the fish physically, and the 
phenomenon of multiple eyes had not been previously observed in multiplied 
structures. Moreover, Thomas Leusid cannot exclude the possibility of 
parasitic organisms or some other as yet unknown factor. For confirmation of 
the inbreeding explanation, Leusid’s research team should raise catfish from 
Millpond in laboratory conditions. The Milltown Clarion tells about Malcolm 
Reis’s research, according to which people only 15 kilometers away had 
discovered parasite-inflicted mutations in fish as well as in frogs studied by 
Reis. The investigation of the environmental damage caused by the Db09 
toxins of Bonaventure Mills can also be regarded as biased and partial, because 
the company provides financial backing for the study. In addition, Sandy 
Evans’ study of mutagens was conducted on bacteria only, so this study cannot 
necessarily be directly compared with mutation effects in fish.  
(Study IV, student 5, written answer) 
Study II showed that some of the thorough processing students had problems with 
decision-making. These students further acquired knowledge in a rather uncritical 
way. In the problem-solving situation they rarely evaluated the reliability of the 
documents. Indeed, these students did not have clear criteria for evaluating the 
reliability or the relevance of information. They simply trusted their intuition: 
This just seems scientific somehow.  
(Study II, student 6, think aloud) 
 I don’t know how I should formulate this, but I’ll start by saying that when I 
read, for instance... or when I’m taking classes, I don’t spend a whole lot of 
time wondering if some piece of information is reliable or not.  
(Study II, student 6, interview) 
These students started to analyse and interpret thoroughly all information 
presented in the documents. They identified all major facts and ideas. They also 
considered various decisions or explanations, but could not explain what decision 
was the best or why. There were too many options available. These students 
endlessly weighed the different options. Because the students did not reach clear 
conclusions, they did not present any arguments for accepting a particular 
conclusion. They showed an inability to adjust their thinking to new evidence or 
make changes in their actions. They somehow analysed the problem too deeply. 
Table 7 provides an overview of the student profiles presented in Studies II, III 
and IV. The aspects that distinguished the profiles were the differences in (1) the 
skills and dispositions to think critically, (2) the nature of knowledge that a 
student considered as relevant (3) the knowledge that a student acquired and used 
in the problem-solving situation and (4) the way the student processed that 
knowledge.  
  
  
 It is important to notice here that Study III focused solely on students’ written 
CLA responses, while Study IV focused on students’ tests responses and self-
reported questionnaire items. Therefore, we were not able to investigate more 
deeply the extent to which differences in the students’ answers arose from 
conscious and intended strategies, as was the case in Study II. However, I argue 
that among these three studies there are shared perspectives. Firstly, in all three 
studies the students’ critical thinking was measured by using the CLA 
performance task. Secondly, the results of Studies III–IV demonstrated that the 
students’ CLA written answers reveal the level of processing, and thus extended 
the understanding of two qualitatively different profiles of critical thinking as 
identified in Study II. In addition, in Study IV all students reported on their 
background questionnaires the effort they had put into completing the tasks. 
Thorough processing students stated that they had done their best or close to their 
best, while students who belonged to the superficial processing profile reported 
that they had put some effort into completing the tests. These findings are also 
consistent with the findings of Study II. 
 
The results of Studies II, III and IV suggested that a significant number of the 
higher education students had problems constructing arguments and 
paraphrasing the meaning of original passages in their own words. Statistical 
analysis of the CLA scores in Study IV showed that, with regard to the CLA sub-
scores, the mean of written effectiveness was significantly lower than the means 
of the other two CLA sub-scores, indicating that students tended to have lower 
scores in writing than in analytical reasoning and problem solving. Therefore, 
Study III focused on deepening understanding of why argumentation and 
paraphrasing are problematic for higher education students. 
Argumentation, especially the tradition of written argumentation, has had an 
essential role in academic discourse (Keinonen & Kärkkäinen, 2010). Even though 
there are many field-specific conventions in academic writing, it is possible to 
identify commonalities in texts at the micro level: we can analyse the construction 
of a solid argument (Walton, 1995), as well as the nature of paraphrasing if we 
have the original source at our disposal (Walker, 2010). Furthermore, 
argumentation and paraphrasing are core components in any discipline. By 
analysing qualitative differences in argumentation and referencing, it is possible 
to identify when and where higher education teachers need to intervene. 
Strategies that support writers can then be identified. There are myriad factors 
related to and influencing academic writing, such as institutional procedures, 
field-specific conventions and students’ prior knowledge, expectations and social 
background, as well as the amount of time and effort the student spends on his or 
her studies (Arum & Roksa, 2011a; Lea & Street, 1998). Individual teachers have 
 little or no influence over many of these factors. Therefore, Study III focused 
specifically on the aspects of academic writing that every higher education teacher 
can address in teaching. 
The term argument is traditionally defined as “an attempt to present evidence 
for a conclusion by providing claims that support the conclusion” (Groarke 2013, 
para. 9). In a good argument reasons and claims are consistent with the conclusion 
(Siegel & Biro, 1997). Study III identified three main problems in argumentation, 
which we labelled ‘unclear argumentation’, ‘isolated facts’ and ‘incorrect 
arguments/fallacies’ (see Table 5). In ‘unclear argumentation’, substantial claims 
or reasons that support the conclusion were missing, thereby leaving the 
argument obscure or lacking in logic. ‘Isolated facts’ refers to a situation in which 
students provided only a single reason or rationale in cases of parallel or 
competing reasons, offered disconnected or random facts and connected these 
with each other without proper justification. ‘Fallacy/incorrect argument’ refers 
to errors in reasoning: students drew a conclusion, but the rationales given did 
not support the conclusion. The fallacies were hasty generalisations, i.e. a student 
argued from a special case to a general rule based on insufficient evidence; an 
irrelevant conclusion, i.e. a student used irrelevant information as evidence; a 
correlation proved causation, i.e. a student argued that a correlation implied 
causation. Incorrect arguments also included appealing to authority, tradition or 
probability rather than a solid argument based on the careful analysis of the 
information provided. In ‘appealing to authority’, a student argued that something 
was true or correct because an authority on something had asserted it was so. 
According to the philosophical literature (Siegel & Biro, 1997; Walton, 1995), 
appealing to authority is not necessarily a fallacy. This kind of argument may 
sometimes be judged as fallacy and sometimes not, depending on the situation. 
The question is whether “the authority is a good one (for the conclusion in 
question)” (Siegel & Biro, 1997, 286). In this case the authority was nominally 
competent, but the problem was that the argument appealed to an authority who 
was biased and thus not relevant to the question. The same phenomenon was 
found in Studies II and IV. In ‘appealing to probability’, a student took something 
for granted because it would probably be true, whereas in ‘appealing to tradition’ 
a student argued that something was true or correct because it correlated with 
tradition.  
Study III identified five types of paraphrasing problems, namely ‘copy without 
source’, ‘copy with source’, ‘poor paraphrasing’, ‘patchwork paraphrasing’ and 
‘conclusions disguised as one’s own’. ‘Copy without source’ refers to a situation in 
which a student copied short portions of a text without a source citation. ‘Copy 
with source’ refers to situations in which a student cited a source, but presented 
the material without quotation marks as if it were paraphrased, when in fact the 
student had copied the material word-for-word. In ‘poor paraphrasing’, a student 
 properly cited the sources, but changed and modified a source text slightly, for 
example, by changing or adding words or using synonyms. Poor paraphrasing 
appeared to include minimal or no processing of the materials. In ‘patchwork 
paraphrasing’, a student pieced together small parts of poorly paraphrased or 
directly copied texts from several sources and possibly some formulations of their 
own. In patchwork paraphrasing some relevant processing of the materials may 
have occurred. ‘Conclusion disguised as one’s own’ refers to a situation in which a 
student paraphrased conclusions from the materials without a citation, giving the 
impression that the conclusions were the result of the student’s own analysis.  
 
In the empirical findings of this thesis, variations in the student’ critical thinking 
were evident. The empirical results showed that students’ critical thinking skills 
were unevenly developed (Studies II, III & IV). In other words, a student might 
have the ability to identify and evaluate information, for example, yet at the same 
time struggle with other abilities, such as arriving at a conclusion, adjudicating 
conflicting claims or producing arguments. Furthermore, Studies II, III and IV 
emphasised that the nature of the difficulties and their variance among students 
were interlinked with the students’ ability to utilise and process the available 
materials. For example, in Study IV, the written responses of the superficial 
processing students revealed several problems in identifying, interpreting, 
synthesising and evaluating information, as well as in producing explanations and 
arguments in their own words. By contrast, the written responses of the thorough 
processing students demonstrated that the task materials were processed in great 
depth. The latter group showed that they knew how to define problems, analyse, 
interpret and evaluate the information on all sides of an issue and use relevant 
data to produce arguments and explanations. However, it is important to 
recognise that even the students who processed materials in depth had some 
trouble producing convincing arguments.  
The same issue also emerged in Study III. The specific types of problems in 
academic writing and the ways in which the problems were related to each other 
differed among the participants, which allowed us to identify the nature of the 
problems encountered by the student writers. Three text groups were identified 
and, on the basis of their characteristic features, labelled ‘superficially processed 
texts’, ‘patchy texts’, or ‘thoroughly processed texts’. These three categories 
characterise how students used and processed the available source materials; they 
also illustrate how coherent and organised the students’ written answers were. In 
addition, the groups captured the diversity of problems in academic writing, 
including problems in argumentation and paraphrasing. The group labelled 
‘superficially processed texts’ included answers in which the students did not 
present evidence of their own understanding or processing of the materials. In the 
 group labelled ‘patchy texts’ the answers were uneven in quality. In the group 
labelled ‘thoroughly processed texts’, the written answers demonstrated a deep 
processing of the materials. These answers were also organised in a cohesive way. 
The problems identified in argumentation and paraphrasing were evident in all 
groups, but were fewer among students who had thoroughly processed the 
materials as compared to the two other groups of writers. 
 
 Table 8 illustrates how many students in each group struggled with each 
specific problem in argumentation and paraphrasing in Study III. There were 
substantial differences in how the categories and their frequency varied among 
the groups. In the groups ‘superficially processed texts’ and ‘patchy texts’ the 
problems tended to repeat within one and the same answer, whereas in the group 
‘thoroughly processed texts’, the problems tended to be merely isolated 
occurrences. 
 
The results of Study II indicated that students had various skills in their ability to 
adapt their thinking and their performance flexibility to the demands of the task. 
There was clear variation in the students’ ability to change their actions or ways of 
critical thinking, and we identified both rigidity and flexibility. Flexibility meant 
that the students could modify their actions and processes and change their 
behaviours as needed, whereas rigidity refers to situations in which students could 
not change their processes or look at things from a new perspective or adjust to 
new evidence in a problem-solving situation. Students who were able to make 
changes in their actions showed open-mindedness and an inquiring attitude. The 
students who acted in a flexible manner in the problem-solving situation were also 
able to reflect on their thinking process and use their self-evaluation skills.  
In the following extract, one student describes how he adjusted his 
performance and ended up analysing and interpreting the documents correctly 
instead of copying conclusions from the materials:  
I approached ?this assignment? maybe a little too much as if I had simply 
copied what they say here in these papers and put them down ?in my answer?. 
But then when I started thinking, like about my own views on the topics, then 
right off in [question] number one, it took me a really long time to answer this 
question.   
(Study II, student 8, interview) 
On the other hand, there were students who could not adjust their thinking or 
performance. Some of these students said that they always act in the same way: 
Well, I’m always like this time-management catastrophe. Like in exams and 
everything, especially exams, it always feels like I run out of time. And in 
general I notice that in all comprehension and analysis assignments and 
things like that, they always take me a really long time.  
(Study II, student 5, interview) 
 Students who had several problems in critical thinking, yet had flexibility, 
somehow coped with the demands of the task. For example, in Study II, some 
students had problems evaluating documents and did not form a general picture 
of the situation presented in the documents. Because the students were struggling 
with the demands of the task, they selected documents and reproduced arguments 
and conclusions just as these were presented in the materials. Eventually, the 
students reached a limited conclusion. On the other hand, there were students 
who were skilled in specific critical-thinking skills, such as analysing and 
interpreting information, but lacked other abilities, such as evaluating conflicting 
claims or producing explanations. These students could neither reach a 
conclusion nor were they able to determine the weaknesses of alternative 
solutions. In addition, these students were unable to change their actions or 
thinking; for example, they were not flexible in time management. In addition, 
some of the thorough processing students somehow over-analysed the problem 
(i.e. endless weighing of different options) and, in the end, they failed in the 
problem-solving process. Also in Study IV, one group of thorough processing 
students failed the MCQ. The reason was that they apparently did not have enough 
time to analyse the different response options. 
These results match those observed in earlier studies. For example, Elen et al. 
(2011) have argued that individuals need flexible problem-solving skills in today’s 
rapidly changing society. According to Elen and his colleagues, flexibility is not 
solely a skill, though it implies that an individual is also disposed to act in a flexible 
way. Likewise, Winch (2006, xi) has highlighted the critical role of self-knowledge 
in critical thinking: “?c?ritical appraisal requires not merely the ability to frame 
and evaluate arguments for and against a position, but also knowledge; not just of 
what different ends in life entail, but also their personal suitability. In other words, 
a crucial component of knowledge required is personal self-knowledge, the 
achievement of which itself involves a critical perspective”.  
A summary of the empirical findings of this thesis is presented in Figure 8. The 
figure combines the two main aspects of empirical findings (i.e. student profiles 
and flexibility in critical thinking) to form a comprehensive picture of the nature 
of critical thinking. 
  
  
 
  
Both theoretical and empirical analyses of critical thinking brought out several 
methodological challenges in assessing and analysing this concept.  
Firstly, the theoretical findings of the present thesis demonstrated that the 
confusion between normative and descriptive elements can lead to 
methodological challenges in analysing critical thinking. As noted, determining an 
individual’s conception of knowledge does not reveal what kind of conception 
represents a sophisticated way of thinking. Thus, without theoretical and 
philosophical analyses, the normative dimensions easily remain a researcher’s 
personal interpretation of what kind of thinking is sophisticated. Furthermore, it 
is important to note that the theoretical framework always exerts great influence 
on the way in which data are interpreted and thus directs the analysis. Therefore, 
this thesis suggests that there is a real risk that conceptual problems in the 
framework disturb researchers’ interpretation of empirical data. 
Secondly, the empirical results of the thesis show that measuring critical 
thinking is challenging. Critical thinking tests attempt to capture an individual’s 
thinking skills, that is, something that exists in the mind. As mentioned in the 
theoretical framework, there is no particular assessment method that sufficiently 
captures the whole phenomenon of critical thinking (see also Bailing & Siegel, 
2003). The methodological aim here was to enhance understanding of the crucial 
role played by the assessment instrument as well as the method of analysis in 
measuring critical thinking skills. The results of Study II and Study IV supported 
the finding that the type of assessment instrument selected to measure students’ 
critical thinking skills can yield different pictures of those abilities (cf. Bowman, 
2010; Bowman & Seifert, 2011). In this thesis I argue that the different tests can 
give dissimilar results, and separate measurements can capture a one-sided view 
of students’ performance. The following results support these claims:  
  
1. Study II found that students’ belief in themselves as critical thinkers and 
knowers (i.e. the self-report assessment) is not necessarily equivalent to 
how they actually perform in a problem-solving situation. Although some 
students described themselves in the interview as critical (i.e. able to 
analyse arguments and determine the truthfulness of claims), in the 
problem-solving situation they did not evaluate information in the sources 
critically. Because these students did not interpret the documents they 
selected nor did they consider presuppositions, they did not recognise that 
some of the documents were biased. They analysed and interpreted 
information superficially and focused only on isolated details. In order to 
draw conclusions these students mainly reproduced details from the 
documents. Similarly, some students could cite criteria for evaluating 
knowledge, but in practice they did not know how to use these criteria.  
 2. Study IV dealt with test performance differences as measured by two 
different critical thinking tests: a constructed-response task from the 
Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA) and a multiple-choice 
questionnaire (MCQ). The results of Study IV indicated that 10 per cent of 
students had completely opposite test scores when measured by two 
different critical thinking tests, meaning that some students had low scores 
on the CLA and high scores on the MCQ and vice versa (i.e. these students 
had problems producing convincing arguments and explanations and 
integrating information from several sources in writing, but showed few if 
any problems identifying and selecting the right answers from a list of pre-
formulated alternatives). This finding is significant because if tests are 
supposed to measure the same characteristics and dimensions of critical 
thinking, then the results should be similar. Altogether, one third of the 
students performed better on the MCQ than on the CLA, while one fourth 
performed better on the CLA. Study IV suggested that to succeed in both 
the open-ended CLA task and the MCQ, students needed to know how to 
apply different skills and thinking processes flexibly. The MCQ asked 
students to recognise a correct answer from a set of response options, 
whereas the CLA, with its open-ended tasks, asked students to synthesise 
information and produce an answer in their own words. 
Thirdly, the results of Study IV showed that the methods of analysis have an 
important role in assessing critical thinking: different analytical approaches gave 
different perspectives on students’ performance. The results indicated that the 
group-level analyses overran the rich variation in test performance that occurred 
among individual students. To determine whether the students scored differently 
on the two tests, the CLA scores were first converted to follow the same scale as 
the MCQ scores. In other words, we redefined the CLA scores as a proportion of 
the score obtained vis-à-vis the maximum possible score. The means of the 
converted test scores were compared at the group level using paired t-tests. The 
group-level analysis did not show statistically significant differences between the 
CLA and MCQ tests, illustrating that on average the means of students’ test scores 
were similar on both tests (see Table 9).  
  
  
  
The individual-level analysis, however, showed variation among the scores. In 
order to examine how many students had discrepancies in their scores on the two 
assessments, the students were classified into groups based on their MCQ and 
CLA scores. According to their success on the CLA test, the students were 
classified as high performers, corresponding to the best-performing third of the 
students; average performers, corresponding to the middle third; and low 
performers, corresponding to the worst-performing third. The respective groups 
were then created from the MCQ test scores. Table 10 illustrates the interrelation 
and rich variation between these groups. The individual-level analysis showed 
that the correspondence between the CLA and the MCQ was fully comparable in 
45.5 per cent of the students’ test performances. Less than one fifth were high 
performers (n= 50; 15%), average performers (n=42; 13%) or low performers (n= 
58; 18%) on both tests. One fourth of the students (n=79; 24%) performed slightly 
better on the MCQ than on the CLA, while one fifth (n=67; 20%) performed 
slightly better on the CLA than on the MCQ. Ten per cent of the students (n=34) 
performed in completely opposite ways on the two tests. We selected these 
opposite test responses for further analysis because if tests are supposed to 
measure the same characteristics and dimensions of critical thinking, then the 
results should be similar. 
 
 
  
 The qualitative analysis was used to deepen the understanding of the 
characteristic features of the completely opposite test responses and the possible 
reasons behind these test scores. The qualitative analysis of students’ written 
responses revealed that students who had low CLA and high MCQ13 scores had 
problems in producing explanations and arguments in their own words. By 
contrast, the written responses of the students who had high CLA and low MCQ14 
demonstrated that the task materials were processed in great depth. These 
students showed that they knew how to define problems, analyse, interpret and 
evaluate the information on all sides of an issue and use relevant data to produce 
arguments and explanations. On the background questionnaire these students 
reported that they had put their best efforts into completing the tests. It is thus 
somewhat surprising that these thorough processing students performed so low 
on the MCQ. However, the further analyses in Study IV showed that the problem 
with the MCQ was not the wrong answers, but the high number of unanswered 
items (see Table 11). In the test situation the students could not leave any 
questions blank. However, once the allotted time for each section was called, the 
students were forced to move on to the next section. Each item of MCQ measures 
a separate dimension of critical thinking and therefore, requires students to start 
the analysis process from the very beginning over and over again. This could be 
very exhausting for thorough processing students.  
 
                                                        
13 At least 63% of the MCQ items were correct, whereas an average CLA score by two scorers 
ranged from 5.5 to 8.5 out of 18. 
14 An average CLA score by two scorers ranged from 11.5 to 15 out of 18, but fewer than 43% 
of the MCQ items were correct. 
 The results of Study IV suggested that thorough processing strategies lead to 
analysing each multiple-choice alternative deeply, and therefore some of the 
thorough processing students failed on the MCQ. As a consequence, without 
taking into account the number of unanswered items and the number of right and 
wrong answers, the multiple-choice test seemed to provide a narrow view of 
students’ critical thinking. By exploring the relation between right, wrong and 
unanswered items at the individual level, as well as by identifying the qualitative 
differences in the students’ constructed-response answers, Study IV showed that 
both overly superficial and thorough processing strategies entail problems. 
Furthermore, Study II also revealed that both processing strategies entail 
problems if a student cannot adjust his/her thinking processes and actions to the 
demands of the task. 
  
  
 
The theoretical aim of the studies that make up this thesis was to offer new insights 
into conceptualising critical thinking and its prerequisites, especially conceptions 
of knowledge. Study I showed that the philosophical and psychological research 
traditions partly use the same epistemological concepts, such as relativism, 
realism and absolutism. However, there are several examples showing that these 
two academic traditions give different meanings to these concepts. In 
psychological research on the conceptions of knowledge this difference is 
explained as deriving from the different nature of the research traditions 
(Kitchener, 2011; Southerland et al., 2001). In other words, empirically-orientated 
research on knowledge is traditionally considered descriptive in nature and 
therefore is distinct from the normative philosophical research on knowledge. 
However, Study I revealed shared elements between these two research areas: the 
theory of PE clearly involves normative assumptions. One normative element is 
the claim of superiority of some conceptions of knowledge over others, and the 
other involves pedagogical recommendations. It is important to point out that the 
normative elements are generally characteristic of all such educational research, 
which is intended to develop teaching and learning practices by offering 
pedagogical recommendations based on empirical findings. Therefore, PE as well 
as other educationally-orientated research needs both philosophical and 
empirical approaches as well as dialogue between these two academic fields. 
Problems occur if the empirical findings (descriptive elements) are confused with 
normative assumptions, that is, based on empirical findings a researcher 
interprets how thing should be. Such conclusions and interpretations commit the 
naturalistic fallacy. It follows that on the basis of descriptive features, we cannot 
formulate any conclusion concerning the superiority of one conception of 
knowledge over another. Study I illustrated how the naturalist fallacy may result 
in problems both in relation to empirical research and to pedagogical 
recommendations. 
In previous studies of PE, several researchers have questioned the 
appropriateness of the terms naïve or sophisticated and have presented an 
argument for alternative terms considered to be less judgemental (Elby & 
Hammer, 2001; Muis, 2004). This thesis encourages us to rethink the theoretical 
bases and criteria for why certain beliefs are considered sophisticated or not. In 
my view, changing or replacing the terms is not a sustainable solution. Bailin and 
Siegel (2003) have also problematised the idea of constructing the hierarchical 
models of knowledge. They use Bloom’s (1956) taxonomy as an example, in which 
 the recall of information is represented as the lowest category of thinking, whereas 
evaluation is considered the highest. They argue that this kind of hierarchical 
classification does not actually refer to the nature of knowledge nor does it provide 
epistemic criteria for why certain kinds of knowing are judged to be relevant or 
irrelevant. Rather such a classification describes the outcomes of thinking. For 
these reasons Bailin and Siegel (2003, 188) note that “rather than attempting to 
categorize thinking into different kinds to be placed on a hierarchy, it is much 
more fruitful to focus on what is involved in fulfilling the relevant critical criteria, 
no matter what the task or context—that is, to focus on critical thinking”.  
The findings here suggest that the scarcity of theoretical analyses in the 
empirically-orientated research may lead to a situation in which the meanings and 
prerequisites of the concepts are not adequately defined. As a result, researchers 
may use the same concept to describe different meanings or vice versa. As Study I 
showed, there are three different positions labelled relativist in the context of PE. 
Previous research on PE has not thoroughly distinguished the differences between 
these positions or the consequences that follow from them. This kind of 
conceptual diversity can easily cause confusion: one cannot be sure which form of 
relativism a researcher is committed to unless the meaning of the concept is 
carefully explicated. Furthermore, researchers are continuously producing new 
concepts along with the old. As Hofer and Bendixen (2012, 227) explain, while 
there are some advantages in conceptual diversity, there are also some serious 
problems: “[t]hese diverse explorations across fields and subfields have not only 
enriched the study of personal epistemology but also made it difficult for 
researchers to communicate effectively and hampered the coherence of this 
substantial research area”. These examples indicate that theoretical analyses are 
needed to clarify prerequisites and make distinctions among concepts. Theoretical 
analysis provides a bridge between theory and practice. It is possible to elucidate 
the background assumptions as well as the contradictory statements and 
inconsistencies in the theoretical framework by analysing the interconnections 
among the concepts. For these reasons I argue that theoretical and conceptual 
analyses are not insignificant matters. Theoretical framework is the researcher’s 
tool for analysing and interpreting data. If the tool is not adequate, then there is a 
real risk that the analyses will be distorted.  
This thesis demonstrates how philosophical research could contribute to the 
normative dimensions of educational theory, particularly by revealing some 
conceptual inconsistencies and contradictory assumptions in the theory. The 
thesis further introduces the notion of fallibilism as a way out of conceptual 
inconsistency. Contemporary philosophical epistemology offers the concept of 
epistemological fallibilism to avoid relativism without committing one to naïve 
realism or epistemological absolutism. 
 As a conclusion, this thesis makes the claim that the theoretical framework of 
PE as well as its pedagogical recommendations would benefit by including 
fallibilism among its epistemological conceptions. The notion of epistemological 
fallibilism has two kinds of implications for the research on PE: some of these 
implications are related to the theoretical framework and others to the 
pedagogical recommendations. At the theoretical level, the concept of fallibilism 
can expand and refine the theoretical framework of PE, as was the case in Study 
II. At the pedagogical level, a fallibilist view of knowledge can be seen as a 
responsible epistemic position. It can further be seen as a psychologically mature 
view of knowledge, because this position admits to uncertainty of knowledge, but 
does not embrace the relativist conclusion that all beliefs are equally valid. 
Fallibilism is also consistent with the evolutionary understanding of knowledge: 
the bodies of knowledge we now have may be mistaken and thus possible subjects 
for revision, but they have nevertheless survived the process of evolution to this 
point; as such, they provide the best available starting point for further inquiry 
into the choices and actions of the present moment. Epistemological fallibilism 
fits better than relativism with the presumption of critical thinking from the 
theoretical and pedagogical points of view, and would be worth promoting in 
higher education studies. Furthermore, the idea of research-based teaching to 
which the research on learning and teaching in higher education strives to 
contribute relies on there being some criteria for defining teaching methods that 
are adequate in comparison with other methods. This idea is untenable in the 
relativist framework, but not in the fallibilist framework. However, simply 
replacing the problematic terms with fallibilism would be a risky alternative. In 
my view, more dialogue is needed between theoretical and empirical research to 
refine both the theory of epistemological development and how fallibilism is 
integrated into this theory, as well as its educational implications. For example, 
the idea of evaluativism as the most developed epistemological position has some 
similarities (i.e. the possibility of evaluating knowledge in the light of reasons and 
evidence) to the epistemological fallibilism defended in this thesis. Unfortunately, 
the concept of evaluativism seems to include some problematic assumptions. One 
of these concerns the idea of humans as constructing facts. Kuhn’s model, which 
states that all knowledge is generated by human beings, leads to an absurd 
conclusion (see Table 1). It follows, for example, that the findings of natural 
science exist only if there are human beings who made and conceptualised these 
findings. However, if Kuhn (2005) means in her model that at the highest level of 
knowing human beings have an active role in constructing their own 
understanding, this view would not lead to a philosophically problematic 
conclusion. 
It is important to emphasise that Study I as a philosophical analysis is not 
criticising the empirical findings—the descriptive elements—of previous PE 
 research. For example, on the basis of empirical research, it can be true that 
students’ conceptions of knowledge develop towards relativism or that students 
share the absolutist view of knowledge. However, the point of Study I was that 
even if it is empirically true that students share the relativist view of knowledge, 
this would not place relativism in an epistemologically justifiable and 
sophisticated position, and thus relativism should not be fostered as a goal of 
higher education. Of course, it is also possible that the theoretical model used in 
interpreting empirical data has distorted the research findings, but that problem 
is an empirical matter. It is also important here to understand that interpretations 
of the superiority of knowledge are researchers’ constructions and interpretations. 
In line with this argument, Perry (1970, 206) himself has noted:  
Our discovery of this particular sequence of challenges as an element common 
to all our students’ experience was a product of our own relation to our data. It 
was salient to us, and our judges confirmed its generality throughout the 
reports of our students. This is not to say, however, that other observers with 
other concepts might not find other common elements or developments.15   
 
The goal of the empirical part of the present thesis was to extend the 
understanding of variation in critical thinking and analyse the interconnections 
between students’ conceptions of knowledge and critical thinking skills. This 
descriptive aim attempted to depict how different aspects of critical thinking and 
the conception of knowledge are intertwined. The research involved three 
empirical studies, each of which contributed to the understanding of the nature of 
critical thinking from different perspectives. The results demonstrated the 
complex and reciprocal relationship between students’ conceptions of knowledge 
and critical thinking. Critical thinking emerged as a tool for understanding and 
determining the relevance and reliability of knowledge. Students’ conceptions of 
knowledge reflected how the students acquired, evaluated, justified and utilised 
knowledge in a problem-solving situation (see Figure 9). For instance, those 
students who believed that knowledge could attain truth only when produced by 
a reliable process (i.e. using empirical methods or consulting experts) palmed off 
justification for knowing on authorities, and they did not analyse or evaluate that 
knowledge.  
                                                        
15 Emphasis added. 
  
The results demonstrate that some undergraduate students had real problems in 
critical thinking. For example, Study IV demonstrated that almost one fifth of the 
students had low scores on both critical thinking assessments. While some 
problems were related to the lack of disposition or skill, such as an inability to 
evaluate the credibility of information, examine presuppositions, make 
interpretations, develop a personal perspective or generate arguments or 
conclusions, other problems were related to an inability to modify the whole 
critical-thinking process in a flexible manner or resulted from a combination of 
these aspects. The same phenomenon has been observed in previous research on 
critical thinking (e.g. Arum & Roksa, 2011a; Bok, 2006; Pascarella et al., 2011). 
The thesis suggests that the nature of the problems and their variance are related 
to the students’ ability to utilise and process the available materials. As an 
example, incorrect arguments were prevalent in both profile groups, but these 
were fewer among students who thoroughly processed the materials as compared 
to the superficial processing students (Study II-IV). 
 The results of Study IV showed that 18 per cent of participants were low 
performers on both tests. All students who participated in this study were 
volunteers. It is thus possible that the students who agreed to participate were 
more academically inclined than those who did not and that they felt more 
confident in their test performance and writing skills. This suggests that the 
difficulties in critical thinking with which students struggle may be greater than 
Study IV indicates. We know from the background questionnaire that the majority 
of the students (82%) reported putting their best effort or almost best effort into 
taking these two tests; only four students reported that they had put little or no 
effort into the tests. This indicates that most of participants were committed to 
trying their best in using these assessment tools. 
Although the aim of the present research was not to seek explanations for why 
students’ critical thinking skills varied, the empirical results raise the question of 
what is behind the difference in student profiles. The results showed that some 
superficial processing students did not really know how to produce convincing 
arguments and explanations or how to integrate information from several sources, 
whereas some students in this profile did not share open-mindedness or an 
inquiring attitude to think critically and thus struggled with the task. Previous 
research has shown that there are several other aspects that influence students’ 
performance, such as institutional procedures, field-specific conventions and 
students’ prior knowledge, expectations and social backgrounds, as well as the 
amount of time and effort that the student spends on his or her studies (Arum & 
Roksa, 2011a; Lea & Street, 1998; Nortedge, 2003; Ylijoki, 2001). The problems 
may also indicate that the students were not familiar with the assignment, 
meaning that the learning patterns developed by students in their prior studies 
were not suited to the new and changed demands. Problems in reasoning may also 
be explained by the fact that students who are at an intermediate level of expertise, 
as was the case in Studies II and IV, commonly have problems integrating 
different bodies of knowledge in a problem-solving situation (Boshuizen, 2004). 
Based on the findings of previous studies and this thesis, I suggest that the best 
results in coping with different demands can be achieved by increasing students’ 
self-evaluation skills and flexibility in critical thinking.  
 
The empirical data for this research were analysed by combining data-driven and 
theory-driven approaches, which offered different perspectives on critical 
thinking. At the beginning of my doctoral study my goal was to explore the data 
utilising a theory-driven approach, but during the analytical process in Study II, I 
realised that the data would not fit the pre-existing theoretical framework used in 
most of the research in educational psychology. I found that by using a 
 multifaceted approach (combining the data- and theory-driven approaches as well 
as the empirical and theoretical analyses) it was possible to deepen my 
understanding of the emphases and gaps in the prevailing empirical research on 
critical thinking and personal epistemology. The dialogue between the empirical 
and theoretical analyses offered new insights into conceptualising critical thinking 
and its pre-requisites and an opportunity to deepen my understanding of the 
variations in critical thinking. By combining the theoretical, empirical and 
methodological perspectives, I was able to use these new perspectives, such as the 
concept of fallibilism, to analyse the empirical data on critical thinking. The 
findings here thus contribute to our understanding of the important role of the 
theoretical framework.  
The strength of this thesis is its use of a multifaceted approach to assess critical 
thinking. The approach here included (a) combining different methods in data 
collection (including students interviews/self-reports, two different performance-
based assessments, the think-aloud-method and video observation), and (b) 
combining different analytical methods. The focus of the analyses varied from 
theoretical to empirical, and ranged as well as from a phenomenon-level analysis 
and a group-level analysis to an individual-level analysis. These approaches 
provide a way of considering the overlapping aspects of critical thinking examined 
and increase the reliability and interpretability of the findings (Creene, Carecelli, 
& Graham, 1989; Abowitz & Toole, 2010). The advantage of combining the 
individual-level and group-level analyses is that this offers multiple insights into 
understanding of critical thinking from different standpoints—from a macro-level 
to a micro-level. The thesis findings support the view that the group-level analyses 
need to be complemented by individual-level analyses in order to capture a more 
nuanced picture of performance differences (Lindblom-Ylänne et al., 2013). 
Through a multifaceted approach it was also possible to introduce new 
perceptions and gain a more complete understanding of the phenomenon 
(Johnson et al., 2007). And while the sample size was small, the multi-method 
approach produced a large amount of data on each participant. 
The thesis results are consistent with other studies and suggest that one 
assessment or analysis method is not enough to evaluate complex cognitive 
processes (e.g. Baartman et al., 2007; Bowman, 2010; Dierick & Dochy, 2001; 
Maclellan, 2004). The key challenge in assessing critical thinking, which involves 
mental processes, is that this kind of phenomenon is not directly observable. 
Therefore, interpretations of an individual’s critical thinking are more or less 
indirect. The research literature provides ample arguments both for and against 
the different assessment formats. However, researchers have yet to agree on the 
best way to measure critical thinking. Each assessment instrument and each 
format for critical thinking has strengths and weaknesses. Students’ self-reports 
do not necessarily correspond to their abilities to solve real problems and to utilise 
 critical thinking skills in different situations. The most important drawback to the 
multiple-choice tests is not being able to know how students processed the test 
items: the results show whether or not the student has selected the right answer, 
but reveals nothing about how the student ended up with the solution. Nor do the 
multiple-choice tests measure students’ abilities to produce arguments or give 
reasoned explanations, which are considered the essential elements of critical 
thinking (e.g. Ennis, 1991; Halpern, 2014). Although the scoring of the 
constructed-response task might be challenging (i.e. it is time-consuming, risks 
scoring bias and so on), the students’ written answers reveal the level of processing 
as well as the level of understanding (cf. Popham, 2003). Additionally, there is 
evidence that the constructed-response task can facilitate reflection and support 
the students’ self-evaluation skills (Andiliou & Murphy, 2014). However, because 
of the scoring challenges, the constructed-response tasks are not necessarily the 
best option for research that focuses on a large dataset.  
There has been widespread concern about the effects of testing. For example, 
testing schemes are assumed to exert considerable influence on what universities 
emphasise in teaching and the qualities of learning they promote (Bennet & Ward, 
1993; Brooks, 2012). Critical thinking tests are also used in educational selection 
for predicting students’ future performance; in other words, test results are used 
to select the students believed to be the best suited to graduate degree 
programmes (Kuhn, 2005). Testing results may have other significant 
implications for policy-making, especially for educational policy within the area 
of higher education (Morgan & Shahjahan, 2014; Douglass et al., 2012). Another 
criticism concerns the focus of the tests. Banta and Pike (2012) have argued that 
the skills and outcomes measured in testing critical thinking represent only a 
small part of what is important in higher education and in working life (see also 
Sackett, Borneman, & Connelly, 2008). This thesis demonstrated that different 
tests can give completely opposite pictures of a student’s abilities. For these 
reasons it is extremely important that researchers, educators and policy-makers 
know the limitations that are associated with different assessment types and 
analytical methods and know, first and foremost, the conclusions and 
interpretations that can be drawn from individual students’ test performance. As 
Arum and Roksa (2011a, 141) have put it: “while the CLA instrument as a measure 
of learning tracks remarkably well with sociological factors at the aggregate group 
or at the institutional level, there are still limitations to its precision at the 
individual level that should caution policy makers from imposing high-stakes 
accountability schemes based on it or similar assessment indicators”. Finally, it is 
worth mentioning that performance-based assessments as well as other testing 
formats do not directly assess the quality of teaching, nor do they reflect a 
student’s educability. Thus, over-interpreting the results of performance 
 assessment as an indicator of the quality of teaching or a student’s capacity to be 
educated is problematic. 
 
Through the use of a multifaceted approach, it has been possible to enhance our 
understanding of variations in critical thinking. However, the present findings 
should not be interpreted as an accurate prediction of the level of undergraduate 
students’ critical thinking. Rather the findings of this study illustrate the nature of 
the phenomenon of critical thinking and how different aspects combine to 
contribute to this crucial skill. The small sample size was one common limitation 
in all of the empirical studies. Another limitation is that none of the studies 
focused on the domain-specific aspects of critical thinking. The domain-specificity 
differences were not reported here or in the original articles because these aspects 
were not a focus of this thesis. However, the domain-specific elaborations could 
facilitate and enrich the insights into critical thinking even further. There are also 
several other limitations. For example, Study II involved a small homogeneous 
sample of students in only one discipline. In Study III only one, ninety-minute 
writing task was used to measure the students’ critical thinking. It is thus possible 
that a certain aspect of the test situation (such as a life situation, activity level and 
mood) may have affected the written responses. In Study IV a total of 2,400 
students were invited to take the test; however, only 330 Finnish students 
participated, leaving the response rate at 13.8 per cent. For the purpose of Study 
IV the low response rate was not a problem because the aim was to compare the 
test instruments (the CLA and MCQ) rather than to make generalisations from a 
small sample to a target population. The small response rate may indicate the risk 
of potential bias in the data. However, this does not necessarily mean that real 
bias exists in the data. Another limitation of Study IV concerned the experimental 
design in the original AHELO study. All students started with the constructed-
response task and thereafter proceeded to the multiple-choice questionnaire. 
Furthermore, Study I focused on a limited number of texts. Given these 
limitations, more communication between the theoretical, empirical and 
methodological perspectives is needed to increase understanding of this complex 
phenomenon in the different spheres and in the different phases of higher 
education. 
It is important to point out that the quality and credibility of small-scale 
qualitative research has been widely discussed (e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2006; Gobo, 2007; 
Larsson, 2009). The conclusion has been that while case studies and small-set 
qualitative studies are more limited than large sample studies in breadth and 
generalisability, they nevertheless provide depth and are especially relevant in 
exploring phenomena from new perspectives, as is the case in the present thesis. 
 In the event of a large sample study, the situation is the reverse. That being said, 
both small and large sample studies are seen as being essential to the development 
of science (Flyvberg, 2006). Abowitz and Toole (2010) have argued that while no 
single method or approach is ideal, integrating different methods and approaches 
in a research design can enhance the reliability of the results and strengthen 
inferences by providing the opportunity to combine different viewpoints. These 
aspects also support the use of a multifaceted approach.  
All the sub-studies here followed the ethical guidelines of the Finnish Advisory 
Board on Research Integrity (2012) for the responsible conduct of research, which 
defines honesty and accuracy as the key aspects (see also Steneck, 2007). The 
different strategies were used to enhance the accuracy and reliability of the results. 
Firstly, the multi-method approach was used both in data collection and analysis. 
Secondly, all test instruments (MCQ and CLA) were translated into Finnish and 
adapted to a Finnish context using the detailed procedure (see Appendix B). Three 
certified translators participated in this process. The content validity of the CLA 
constructed-response task as well as the validity of the translation were confirmed 
by using the students’ interviews and think-aloud method (i.e. a pilot study before 
the large-scale research was undertaken). Furthermore, in Study IV the students’ 
CLA responses were double-scored by two independent, trained scorers.  
The analytical process for each sub-study is explained in the original 
publications and in the Methods and Procedures section of the current document. 
The analysis processes of sub-studies were nonlinear; they involved moving back 
and forth among all the data, data items, analysed qualities and understanding of 
the phenomenon based on prior studies. The final results of each sub-study were 
revised and cross-checked several times to see if they worked in relation to the 
coded extracts and the entire data set. In Study III the first author was responsible 
for coding the data using the ATLAS.ti programme. The credibility of the coding 
was checked by the second author, who coded 25 per cent of the data. The 
consistency was 95 per cent. Thereafter, the first author considered the suggested 
changes and changed the coding where appropriate. In Studies I, II and IV the 
analyses were conducted in collaboration with all the authors. In the analysis 
investigator triangulation (Denzin, 1970, 2012; Creswell & Miller, 2000) was 
utilised to confirm the reliability of the findings, meaning that the final results 
were obtained by means of a thorough discussion with all the authors. 
From the ethical point of view, it is also important to make sure that all sub-
studies were carried out without causing harm to the individuals involved. 
Voluntary participation, informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality are 
seen as key ethical concerns in behavioural science research (Finnish Advisory 
Board, 2009). In the present thesis each database for the three original empirical 
studies was processed in such a way that the participants could not be identified. 
Additionally, all participating students were volunteers. All students gave their 
 written consent for participation, and all were informed that consenting or 
refraining from consenting would not affect their status or subsequent grades in 
any way. In Studies III and IV students were also informed that they would not 
receive individual feedback on their performance. The purpose was to collect 
baseline data about incoming students’ critical thinking skills. Based on this data, 
necessary interventions can be used in teaching. 
 
Higher education studies are intended to provide students with the necessary 
knowledge and skills required in different positions of expertise. Many scholars 
have pointed out that if undergraduate studies are assumed to contribute to the 
development of critical thinking skills, then teaching and learning activities need 
to be purposefully designed to that end (Arum & Roksa, 2011a; Badcock, Pattison, 
& Harris, 2010; Halpern, 2014). According to Biggs and Tang’s (2007) widely used 
recommendation, students learn what they do. In a similar vein Arum and Roksa 
(2011a) explain in their recent study that expectations play a key role in facilitating 
students’ learning outcomes. In their (2011a, 93) words: “when faculty have high 
expectations, students learn more”. In other words, critical thinking should be an 
integral part of higher education and should be explicitly acknowledged in 
curricula and course outlines. If the topic is not addressed, then there is a risk that 
critical thinking will remain coincidental in most courses and will depend on the 
views that the teacher holds about the effectiveness and methods of teaching 
critical thinking. Furthermore, there is the real risk that the concept of critical 
thinking will remain only “part of the vocabulary of higher education audit-speak” 
(Furedi, 2004, 2nd paragraph).  
Students are expected to obtain both subject-specific knowledge and critical 
thinking skills as part of their higher education. However, the present thesis 
argues that the idea of developing knowledge and skills without the notion of 
individual disposition is superficial. It follows that students should also be guided 
to adopt an outlook of thinking critically (Siegel, 1988). As mentioned above in the 
theoretical framework, from a theoretical point of view the core elements of 
critical thinking are knowledge, skills and disposition. Students need to have 
knowledge of what is reasonable for the task or problem, the relevant skills to 
evaluate and utilise that knowledge and the disposition to do so. The empirical 
part of this doctoral thesis has identified differences between students in all these 
aspects of critical thinking. According to Halpern (2014, 18), the key aspects of 
teaching critical thinking are (1) focusing explicitly on critical thinking skills (e.g. 
teaching explicit ways to analyse and evaluate arguments, recognise biases and 
weak arguments, provide arguments and make decisions), (2) developing a 
 disposition for effortful thinking and learning, (3) focusing on learning activities 
that increase the probability of transfer and (4) focusing on metacognitive skills. 
From the practical point of view, one important implication of the present 
thesis relates to acknowledging the variations in critical thinking. Although 
students enter higher education with widely varying skills, they are all expected to 
begin developing critical thinking and learning the proper conventions from the 
very beginning of their study. However, previous studies have called attention to 
the fact that students’ critical thinking skills do not always develop during their 
years in higher education (Arum & Roksa, 2011a; Bok, 2006; Pascarella et al., 
2011). The findings here showed that after three years of higher education, 
students’ critical-thinking skills differed greatly. Because there was substantial 
variation in the students’ critical thinking, it seems that a one-size-fits-all model 
of teaching is inadequate. In the future it would be fruitful to investigate how 
different pedagogical solutions may facilitate and improve the development of 
critical thinking for different kinds of students. Such a study would help us 
support students in developing better critical thinking skills by creating learning 
settings and tasks that more appropriately meet students’ different needs.  
However, before we can develop the necessary settings and give more detailed 
pedagogical recommendations, we should first determine what kind of critical 
thinking can reasonably be developed in higher education—what are the desirable 
aims of critical thinking, and why? If we bypass the theoretical analysis of the 
normative elements of teaching critical thinking, there is a real risk that we will 
offer recommendations based only on researchers’ implicit interpretations of what 
is worth pursuing rather than offering recommendations based on adequate, 
critical discussion and argumentation. Owing to the normative nature of 
pedagogy, pedagogical recommendations cannot follow directly from empirical 
research. That is to say, we require both empirical evidence about the effectiveness 
of different pedagogical models and also philosophical understanding about the 
normative elements of teaching critical thinking (see Bailin & Siegel, 2003). As 
noted, this kind of dialogue is very important, because the relationship between 
normative and descriptive elements of teaching cannot be adequately formulated 
without co-operation between these two research approaches. Therefore, if we 
want to make pedagogical recommendations regarding the teaching of critical 
thinking, we need to understand both areas of research.  
 
In the present work a variety of perspectives has been emphasised in order to 
understand better the various aspects and dimensions of critical thinking. Based 
on the findings of this thesis, the following seven issues concerning critical 
thinking are seen as important for further elaboration. The first two concern the 
 empirical findings, the next two deal methodological issues, and the last three 
concern theoretical issues: 
 
1. This doctoral thesis has identified two student profiles: superficial 
processing and thorough processing. The results indicated that thorough 
processing students mainly solved problems in a critical manner, whereas 
superficial processing students more often addressed the problems in an 
uncritical manner. In other words, the students in the superficial profile 
did not demonstrate a serious attempt to analyse, interpret, evaluate or 
synthesise information from the materials provided for the task. In the 
problem-solving situation these students disregarded much of the 
information and used only one or two sources. Nor did the students 
consider presuppositions or connections between different points of view. 
Their reasoning was poor, and they provided vague arguments. This means 
that these students provided claims or conclusions, but did not provide 
valid reasons or explanations to support their claims, thereby leaving their 
arguments weak. Several types of fallacies were also identified.  
By contrast students in the thorough processing profile identified the 
major ideas in the problem-solving situation. These students 
demonstrated thorough and accurate understanding of the materials: they 
evaluated the quality of the information and considered its premises as 
well as the implications of different conclusions. Most of them weighed 
different options, analysed connections between claims, connected related 
ideas and, moreover, gave reasoned explanations. These students further 
identified and used several criteria in evaluating the reliability of the 
information: corroborating claims from different sources, evaluating the 
context in which the claim was made, exploring who interpreted the data 
and evaluating the presuppositions. Their approach to analysing, 
evaluating and utilising knowledge can be seen as a psychologically mature 
view of critical thinking.  
Testing critical thinking can be considered as an intervention. The 
instructions of the CLA constructed-response task used in this thesis 
advised students to analyse the materials as well as to justify their 
positions. Moreover, after the tests many students reported that the 
constructed-response task guided their analytical process and pushed 
them to think independently. Therefore, it was rather surprising to find 
students who seemed to be satisfied with superficial processing. Based on 
the thesis findings, I suggest that reflection and self-evaluated skills are 
connected with flexibility and the intention to use critical thinking skills. 
Future studies would thus benefit from focusing more deeply on students’ 
 self-evaluation skills, that is to say, why some students were unable to 
adjust their thinking process and why some students decided on superficial 
analyses.  
It is also worth of mentioning that sometimes thinking tasks can demand 
a superficial, or at least quicker, thinking processing as was the case in 
Study IV. Therefore, the threshold question is that how well students are 
able to adapt their thinking process to the demands of the situation. 
2. In this thesis I argued that students’ performance in critical thinking 
assessments is associated with the level of processing and the effort made 
during the test, their dispositions (such as motivational aspects and open-
mindedness), their conceptions of knowledge, as well as the students’ 
ability to adjust their actions and thinking processes in a flexible manner. 
Previous studies have shown that students’ expectations, prior knowledge, 
social backgrounds, institutional or cultural aspects also have an influence 
on their test performance (e.g. Arum & Roksa, 2011a; Fellenz, 2004; Snow, 
1993). In future studies on critical thinking, it would thus be fruitful to 
investigate students’ performance in relation to their expectations. 
Furthermore, the communication between general and discipline-specific 
perspectives of critical thinking can be used to examine contextual 
differences. This kind of research would deepen our understanding of how 
contextual aspects affect students’ performance. Additionally, longitudinal 
measurements and course work effort (i.e. how much time the students 
spend studying) would further extend our understanding of the 
development of critical thinking. A recent longitudinal study has shown 
that students who study by themselves and show a high level of 
engagement with reading and writing (i.e. read more than 40 pages a week 
and write more than 20 pages per semester) develop more reasoning and 
written communication skills than students who do less (Arum & Roksa, 
2011a). 
3. The empirical and methodological findings of the doctoral thesis enhance 
our understanding of the important role of the analysis method and the 
assessment format used. Combining various assessment and analytical 
approaches made it possible to obtain a more comprehensive picture of 
students’ critical thinking (see also Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
Additionally, the thesis demonstrates that by using a multifaceted 
approach, it was possible to bring out new perspectives that are not 
currently found in theorisation. As an example, Study II showed that 
students shared the fallibilist view of knowledge. Previous research on PE 
has not identified students who are committed to epistemological 
fallibilism. As noted in Study I, this would have been difficult in any case, 
 as the concept of fallibilism has not previously been included in the PE 
theoretical framework.  
This thesis has drawn its assumptions and viewpoints from philosophical, 
educational and psychological theories and procedures. During the 
analytical process of Study II, I discovered several conceptual 
inconsistencies in terms of the relationship of the empirically-based theory 
of knowledge and its justifications for the conceptions of knowledge. The 
theoretical analysis in Study I provided a tool with which to analyse and 
clarify these inconsistencies and integrate different viewpoints. In my 
view, theoretical analysis has an essential role in evaluating the 
background assumptions of theories. Through theoretical analysis, it was 
also possible to bring out interconnections between the key concepts as 
well as contradictory statements and inconsistencies in the theoretical 
framework (see also Holma, 2009). Theoretical analyses can be used in 
dialogue with empirical analyses in order to refine the prevailing 
theorisation. 
4. The thesis argues that normative and descriptive elements are 
fundamentally intertwined in the research on critical thinking. Therefore, 
research on critical thinking requires co-operation between both 
philosophical and empirical approaches. Here I demonstrate some 
methodological problems that follow from the confusion of these two 
elements and that influence the interpretations of the data. These 
problems also have broad and serious implications, because they have led 
to problematic educational guidelines; for example, researchers have 
promoted relativism as a learning aim and as a background assumption of 
critical thinking.  
In this thesis I have argued that more dialogue between theoretical and 
empirical research is needed. Although the theoretical analysis in Study I 
focused on one particular theory, my broader aim was to demonstrate the 
importance of philosophical analysis to educational theories more 
generally. As with PE, educational theories contain both empirical and 
philosophical research elements. The relationship between these two 
groups of elements cannot be adequately determined without co-operation 
between the two types of research. Researchers should thus be aware of the 
difference between normative and descriptive elements. Both 
educational/pedagogical and philosophical theories include a strong 
normative dimension, whereas (purely descriptive) empirical theories do 
not share such assumptions. However, it is important to understand that 
when a researcher makes interpretations based on empirical theory or on 
the empirical findings of how teaching and learning should be developed 
 or makes claims of superiority of some conceptions as compared with 
others, she or he simultaneously moves into the normative dimension. 
Therefore, the arguments presented in this thesis in relation to PE have 
wide-ranging relevance in educational research.  
5. According to the present thesis, relativism, naïve realism and fallibilism 
have theoretical importance for conceptualising critical thinking. The 
thesis explained why the idea that critical thinking presupposes a relativist 
view of knowledge is untenable. Also, in the context of naïve realism and 
absolutism, critical thinking turns out to be pointless, because certain 
knowledge is received directly from the external world. As mentioned 
several times, fallibilism admits of uncertain knowledge, but does not 
arrive at the relativist conclusion that all beliefs are equal. Fallibilism 
further differs from the variants of absolutism, which claim that there are 
some sources of certainty on which to base our search for understanding. 
This position presumes the possibility of improving our current 
conceptions, theories or beliefs. As Holma (2012, p. 399) aptly states of 
fallibilism, “this position, like the belief that all human knowledge is 
uncertain, coheres with the evolutionary understanding of knowledge: the 
bodies of knowledge we now have may be mistaken and thus [are] possible 
subjects for revision, but they have, nevertheless, survived the process of 
evolution to this point; as such, they provide the best available starting 
point for choices and action of the present moment concerning further 
inquiry” (see also Peirce, 1934ab). From this point of view, epistemological 
fallibilism fits the presumption of critical thinking. 
6. This doctoral thesis has further argued that relativism is an 
epistemological position, which is very difficult to defend not only from a 
philosophical perspective, but also from an educational point of view (see 
also Phillips, 1995, 2007). As Study I explained, relativism is problematic 
in the context of research on learning and teaching in higher education. 
Many of its aims and assumptions contradict relativism. As an example, 
the endorsement of critical thinking as a learning aim (Hofer & Bendixen, 
2012; Kember, 2001; King & Kitchener, 2002, 2004; Kuhn, 2005; Lucas & 
Tan, 2013; Phan, 2008) is pointless in a relativist framework. 
Furthermore, the idea of research-based teaching to which the research on 
learning and teaching in higher education endeavours to contribute, both 
on theoretical and practical levels, relies on the idea that there are criteria 
for defining the kind of teaching methods that are adequate in comparison 
with other methods. If, in contrast, researchers’ beliefs about teaching 
methods were only relative to their own subjective constructions, culture 
 or some other frame of reference, universities would not be justified in 
promoting or advancing this kind of teaching. 
7. In contrast to previous research on PE (King & Kitchener, 2002, 2004; 
Kuhn, 1999, 2005; Kuhn & Weinstock, 2002), this doctoral thesis 
maintains that trusting in objective knowledge or relying on authorities 
does not imply either the possibility of certainty or the idea that our beliefs 
are copies of external reality. Nor is such trust a sign of lower-level thinking 
as such. Actually, to some extent it is sensible to trust in objective 
knowledge and in authorities. If this were not so, why would we need 
education or teachers? Objectivity, truth and certainty refer to different 
points of view. For example, although scientific theories try to achieve the 
highest level of objectivity, it does not follow that any scientific theory is 
certain. 
However, in this thesis, from the point of view of critical thinking, the 
challenge for those students who trusted solely in objective knowledge was 
that they solved the given problem in an uncritical manner. In other words, 
they did not analyse, evaluate or interpret the information contained in the 
documents they were given. They acquired knowledge by appealing to 
authoritative opinion, trusting in verified empirical evidence and listening 
to others’ testimonies. These students palmed off justification for knowing 
on testimonies or on authoritative experts; either they were simply not 
disposed to use their critical thinking skills or they had problems applying 
those skills in a problem-solving situation. Furthermore, some of these 
students tried to justify biased knowledge by appealing to an authority. 
And yet the results showed that these same students did not share the 
belief that knowledge is absolutely certain or unquestionable. Nor did 
these students share the view that beliefs accurately represent or 
correspond to reality. In effect, the students did not share a sense of naïve 
realism. In the future it would be significant to investigate in more depth 
how critical thinking is related to the students’ attitude of testimonies. 
The present thesis introduced the concept of epistemological fallibilism as 
an epistemologically justifiable solution to this theoretical inconsistence. 
The recognition of epistemological fallibilism would also be beneficial both 
to the PE theoretical framework and to PE-based university pedagogy. 
However, the thesis does not argue that fallibilism is the most 
sophisticated position that a person could hold. Actually, the results of the 
present research show that the fallibilist view of knowledge can be 
connected with different profiles in critical thinking. Therefore, more 
research combining theoretical and empirical approaches is needed to 
clarify the theory of epistemic development. It has been suggested that 
 students who share the most sophisticated view of knowledge have the 
ability to make context-sensitive judgements (e.g. Barzilai & Zohar, 2012). 
However, the findings of this thesis suggest that students who use their 
critical thinking skills at remarkably high levels have the ability to make 
context-sensitive judgements. In the future, it would be interesting to 
examine students’ conceptions of knowledge within a larger dataset and in 
different contexts. Besides utilising communication between empirical and 
theoretical research, another unexplored aspect of students’ conceptions 
of knowledge might be identified. Such a study would help to continue 
refining the theories of PE. 
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